• Sunday, July 14, 2024
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Popular culture and Putin’s legitimacy

WASHINGTON — The analytical tools of political science, which describe the Russian regime as undemocratic, illiberal, authoritarian or patronal, fall short of providing an understanding of legitimacy mechanisms at work in the Russian society. Popular culture, often seen as reflecting the values of the overarching political system, can also be an engineer of ideological content and may help explain President Vladimir Putin’s success.

Putin’s re-election to a fourth presidential term in March — by a margin of 76%, with a 70% turnout — was a success for the Kremlin, one that was needed to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy in order to face forthcoming challenges, including stagnating growth and wages. Observers report that the level of falsification of the poll may have been lower than in 2012, but still amounted to several million votes. To this should be added about 7 million votes secured through administrative and corporate enforcement. Even without these manipulations, however, the Russian president would likely have received 70% of the vote with just over 50% turnout — a good result that many Western politicians would envy.

There are multiple reasons for this success: the rally-around-the-flag effect of the annexation of Crimea, which boosted Putin’s popularity to a massive 80%; the general feeling that Russian citizens must back the regime in its confrontation with the West; the lack of genuine political opponents; the population’s need for stability and predictability; and the widespread impression that no one can do better than Putin under current conditions.

Tools of political science tend to look for top-down dynamics, exaggerating the regime’s capacity to shape public opinion with powerful media strategies. The realm of bottom-up interactions and the regime’s impressive ability to adapt and capture existing symbolic reservoirs remain largely understudied. The study of nostalgia for the Soviet Union offers insight into that realm. Another path is to look at popular culture — understood as the cultural habits and consumption patterns of ordinary citizens and ithe working class in particular. This approach was launched in the 1960s by the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, examining how cultural products are “consumed” and how average consumers may also produce meanings.

Popular culture also shapes political ideology and this is the case in Russia, where many of the ideological schemes of the Putin regime were already present in 1990s pop culture. Unlike cinema and television series, often funded wholly or in part by state institutions, Russian pop music develops almost entirely based on the logic of profit and commercial success. Interactions between music and politics are neither new nor unique to Russia — think of the role of country music in connecting the rural American working class to the Republican Party, for instance.

One group from the 1990s that advanced an ideological repertoire for the Putin regime that followed was Lyube, one of Russia’s most popular bands — and reportedly Putin’s favorite. The band combines several styles: Russian rock and romance, songs  from the criminal world, Russian folk music, Soviet retro and Soviet military songs.

The group, which emerged during “perestroika” — the reform movement within the Soviet Communist Party — derived its name from the Lyubertsy, an underground youth movement in the Moscow suburbs linked to an urban criminal subculture that practiced boxing, bodybuilding and martial arts. In the early 1990s, the group experimented with new sounds and ideological topics in tune with the contemporary rediscovery of Russia’s early 20th century, especially the civil war years (1918-1922). One of their first albums, for instance, featured the band dressed like Red Army soldiers. In 1994, the album “Lyube Zone” and film of the same name celebrated the “zona,” the jail world.


Rehabilitating the culture of the criminal underground has since then been a major theme for the band. In 1995, for the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Lyube revisited songs from the war, such as “Combat,” which strongly resonated with the war in Chechnya. At precisely the same time, President Boris Yeltsin, a weakened liberal, decided to reinvest in the cult of World War II as one of the cornerstones of the social consensus. Lyube was invited to play its war songs at a Victory Day concert in Moscow.

Since the 2000s, Lyube has emphasized patriotic lyric songs, often used as soundtracks for blockbuster miniseries about the army, the security services, the special forces and the navy. All celebrate male courage and romanticize the military way of life. In recent years, Lyube has become ubiquitous in state-sponsored concerts. The group does not hide its intimate relationship with the Kremlin. Soon after arriving in power, Putin appointed the group’s lead singer, Nikolay Rastorguyev, now 61, to the position of cultural advisr to the government. A member of the presidential party, United Russia, Rastorguyev has since been elected to the Duma several times and displays his support for the president whenever called upon.

Yet Lyube should not be seen as a product of state-sponsored ideology. The band is genuinely popular and commercially successful, with tens of millions of albums sold and views on YouTube. It tours concerts all over Russia, uniting several generations of fans.

Lyube succeeded in musically embodying the main ideological schemes and themes of the Kremlin. Its trajectory echoes that of the Putin regime: The late Soviet-era fashion for martial arts and bodybuilding inspired the regime’s virile body language. The rehabilitation of the early 20th century and of the Soviet criminal subculture — its language, values, hierarchy and heroes — has become part of the state-sponsored search for cultural consensus. Nostalgia for Soviet retro, and a progressive move toward a militarized patriotism exalting human sacrifice for the motherland, became a successful tool for the regime.

State narratives and Kremlin-backed media may distribute these fundamental units of ideology. Yet what makes ideologies relevant to a large part of the society is that they are produced by a grassroots culture that is mainstream, not by top-down pressure. This popular culture does not follow “the Kremlin’s orders” in deciding what is meaningful. On the contrary, the presidential administration tries to co-opt popular culture to secure its cultural hegemony. Lyube is just one of many examples of how understanding pop culture can help in pinpointing a genuine “Putin consensus.”


Marlene Laruelle is a research professor of international affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.