Insights from case studies
Sometimes, online disinformation could be totally unrelated to a firm and could still end up affecting it. Thus, even as online disinformation is preponderantly focused on politics and propaganda, a pan-African firm must be alert to potential spill-overs, as the case of South Africa’s MTN shows. Furthermore, a proactive and effective handling of online disinformation is possible; that is, even in the relatively difficult African environment. MTN apprised its customers of the false news about purported promotions and the fake social media accounts the disinformation was emanating from. The firm also used the opportunity to reiterate its real social media accounts where customers could get accurate information about its activities.
In the case of Kenya’s defunct Chase Bank, similar diligence was clearly not employed. There was certainly an underestimation by the bank’s communication team of the influence and power of social media to wreak as much havoc on the image of the bank as it did. And when the bank eventually came around to a more accurate appraisal of the crisis at hand, it was too late. There are a few things the bank could have done to stem the tide. It could have refuted with as much vigour the claims about the challenges it was facing. Of course, it did not help that there was evidence of mismanagement by the bank’s executives, which no doubt added flame to the rumours. It also did not help that only a few months back, a similarly-sized bank went under after what turned out to be accurate reports on social media of its financial troubles.
In both cases, it is clear that overwhelming fake news with the truth with as much forcefulness could be an effective strategy. Before social media became such a potent force, the Kenyan bank’s strategy of pretending everything was normal may have worked. It could even have been effective in more developed markets. But in an environment where a lot, rests on word of mouth, a firm should not take the kind of chances the bank took. Like MTN, get in front of it, push out the truth, and approach the respective social media platforms if necessary, to take down fake accounts under the name or brand of your firm.
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To put the cases in proper perspective, I adapt the framework by Wardle & Derakhshan (2017) to suggest a coherent mechanism for African firms to deal with online disinformation. As the framework depicted below shows, a firm would probably only be most effective intervening at the distribution stage of online disinformation. Of course, internet platforms could easily fact-check content on time to determine if it is true or not before they go viral. And as highlighted earlier, they have the capacity to do so. And even as internet platforms are already partnering with Reuters, Africa Check and others to fact-check information distributed on their platforms, they are not incentivised to do so holistically for economic reasons.
| The three phases of information disorder | |||
| Phase | Creation | (Re)Production | Distribution |
| Description | When the message is created | When the message is turned into a media product | When the product is distributed or made public |
| Mitigant(s) | Laws & regulations by governments | Fact-checking by internet platforms | Overwhelming of fake news with truth, related articles, etc. by affected firm(s) |
| Adapted from Wardle & Derakhshan (2017) | |||
Still, as the case of MTN shows, a firm could proactively stop fake news in its tracks. In the event a firm chooses to wait-and-see or rely on internet platforms to bring down false content or seek the aid of law enforcement agencies to punish purveyors of fake news, the damage to a firm could very well have been complete before any of those actors are able to do something meaningful to stem the tide. Regardless, African firms should not wait to be victims of fake news before being part of the solution. Like the MTN case shows, a firm could sponsor training programmes to reduce the production of fake news in the first place. A firm could also engage in public sensitisation campaigns to support the efforts of governments towards discouraging the creation of fake news.
Conclusion and recommendations
Online disinformation is costly, especially in Africa, where a lot of businesses depend on word-of-mouth. A false rumour could trigger a run on a bank, a sharp fall in share prices, or loss of interest in a company’s products. As internet platforms make it easy for fake news to spread quickly in unprecedented ways, they are also best suited to stem the tide. We highlighted examples of efforts by internet platforms in this regard.
More fundamentally, combating online disinformation could be via state intervention, making social media platforms liable for third-party content, and swamping fake news with the truth. Our case studies show; however, firms would probably record more successes in dealing with the problem by the third option; that is, refuting falsehood with the truth. Of course, the experience of firms in this regard differs.
Like the case of South Africa’s MTN, a trusted brand is more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt in the event of negative news, deliberate or otherwise, allowing the firm just about enough time to quickly refute any false reports. Not that there would not still be some damage done, but the costs in the aftermath tend to be manageable. Conversely, a firm already suffering from negative publicity, like the case of Kenya’s defunct Chase Bank, may find it harder to recover from an onslaught of additional negative perception issues via social media.
Firms on the continent should also be loath to use legal action to deal with online disinformation. As the adapted Wardle & Derakhshan (2017) framework shows, firms are best equipped to manage online disinformation at the distribution stage. Ideally, laws against disinformation should be a disincentive against creating fake news, the first stage of the adapted framework. But considering how unreliable law enforcement is across the continent, it is highly unlikely these laws would be effective deterrents. Nonetheless, firms could help at this stage with sensitisation campaigns against disinformation. Additionally, firms could sponsor the training and capacity-building of media practitioners to ensure they do not inadvertently aid the production stage.
Rafiq Raji
Edited version of article was first published by Nanyang Business School’s NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies. References available via link viz. https//nbs.ntu.edu.sg/Research/ResearchCentres/CAS/Publications/Documents/NTU-SBF%20CAS%20ACI%20Vol.%202020-17.pdf
