From April 2020, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has scored consistent victories against the terrorist groups in the Sahel. Using both aerial and ground assaults, MNJTF, which comprises of military troops from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin, have eliminated scores of terrorists and regained previously lost territories. The killing on May 11th of about 75 Boko Haram insurgents around Diffa, a town in the south-eastern part of Niger Republic, was the latest in a string of successful operations.
The terrorist insurgency in the Lake Chad region has been raging for the last decade. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, over 37,500 lives have been lost, 2,5 million persons displaced and about 244,000 Nigerian refugees in other countries. The United Nations Refugee Agency reports that over 26 million people are affected by the conflict in Nigeria’s northeast region.
The MNJTF had suffered some significant defeats in the last three years; however, it appears that its sun has risen. Is there enough evidence to indicate that it is on a sustainable trajectory to victory against the insurgents? This essay, which is based on insights from our affiliates in the conflict zone, interviews with military personnel, and our study of the ongoing conflict, proposes how the MNJTF can consolidate its wins.
Déby’s derby
Many informed observers of the conflict credit President Idriss Déby of Chad as the gamechanger in the battle. Following the March 23rd Boko Haram attack in Bohoma that left 98 Chadian soldiers dead, President Déby took personal charge of the battle. He led the planning and attack that killed over 1,000 insurgents and routed the remnants into Nigeria and Niger. According to a Nextier SPD Associate who is conducting field research in Diffa, President Déby involvement transcends the battlefield into the communities where the people are now emboldened to provide reconnaissance and intelligence to the MNJTF.
The personal involvement of President Déby in the counter-attack and his threat to withdraw Chadian troops from the MNJTF triggered greater commitment from the partners. Lt. General Tukur Buratai, Nigeria’s Chief of Army, relocated to the country’s North-East region from where he is coordinating and directing the counter-terrorism operations. Media reports indicate that “Operation Kantana Jimlan”, which Buratai launched on May 01, has led to the killing of 78 members of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), 56 members of Boko Haram and the arrest of 16 informants. According to Albert Schweitzer, Nobel laureate, example is not the main thing in influencing others; it is the only thing.
Nimble strategy
While Nigeria’s military is taciturn, keen observation indicates that it has abandoned its “Super Camp” strategy for a “degrade” strategy. The former strategy, which consolidates military capabilities within a “fortress”, minimises the risk of terrorists overrunning military bases but leaves the rural areas vulnerable to attacks. With the “degrade” strategy, Nigerian Forces engage in multiple offensive operations to “find, fix, and destroy” the enemies. The strategy aims to destroy the enemies’ information networks and to obliterate their ability to project power.
But the enemy is not sitting on its hands. The attack on Chadian troops in Bohoma provided insights into the increasing sophistication of the insurgent groups especially in terms of their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The military will need diligence in strategy execution to achieve their strategic goals.
Africans have to fight and win this war. While the Nigerian military is moving to a “degrade” strategy, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has shifted from its “degrade” strategy to a “containment” strategy. According to The Defence Post, AFRICOM will continue to provide security assistance to partner nations to increase their willingness and capabilities to counter extremists. However, AFRICOM is looking to African troops to win this war while it continues to provide limited operational support.
Governments in the Sahel must focus on developing their economies. While the “degrade” strategy allows the military to be nimbler and increases their chances of success, the strength of violent extremist organisations is linked to their ease of recruitment which, in turn, is aided by the challenges of extreme poverty, political instability, and economic fragility.
Locked and ready
The new “degrade” strategy has been made possible today because of the recent purchase of military hardware. In April 2020, Nigerian Army took delivery of high-grade armoured tanks and artillery trucks from China. The tanks enable the military to engage in close-up operations against the enemy. This is a major development for an Army that, until recently, used outdated weapons such as the unreliable Shilka guns procured between 1979 and 1983. The equipment was so bad that Major General Olusegun Adeniyi, field commander of “Operation Lafiya Dole”, recorded a mobile phone video that went viral complaining about the insurgent’s weapons advantage. The arrival of the arms has strengthened the Nigerian Forces.
Winning hand
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has narrowed Nigeria’s window for experimentation. The economy is wobbly and there are no excess funds to paper over faulty strategies. As Nigeria continues to record victories against the insurgents, there is a need to consolidate the wins and end the war before the impact of the weakening economy exacerbates.
Coordinated and synergised military operations are needed to maintain the tempo and win the war. Nigeria’s Armed Forces, comprising of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, operate in silos. The Chief of Defence Staff is not the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, a position that would have allowed him effective control of all the armed forces. Rather, the Army and the Air Force carry out separate operations in this war against insurgents. A 2020 report by Carnegie Foundation found that ineffective coordination has hampered the government’s response to the crisis. Okechukwu Ikeanyibe et al., in a 2020 paper on interagency collaboration to defeat Boko Haram, used “complexity theory” to posit that weak institutional capacity to collaborate explains why counter-insurgency collaboration has not yielded results.
Similarly, a historical mistrust between anglophone and francophone political leaders still exist to date. Nigeria should provide political and military leadership and encourage the other countries to commit more to the MNJTF. Nigeria’s dwindling financial position will impact its ability to finance the war especially her major contributions to MNJTF. This may worsen the state of collaboration between the partner countries. Nigeria must continue to demonstrate her political and military will to end the war. This will motivate the other participating states to do more. Chad, through its president, has shown a renewed commitment to ending the war.
Nigeria’s military should seize the opportunity created by the losses suffered by the two major insurgent groups and deploy more soldiers to finish the war. The Military should mop up soldiers from every military formation in the country except for the North-West and South-South regions (where, respectively, rural banditry and piracy are at their peak). The reinforced military strength the North-East, armed with the new equipment and strategy, should suffocate the insurgents and close out this war. Nigeria should avoid a repeat of the March 2015 situation when Nigeria failed to take advantage of air and ground offensive attacks to wrap up a Boko Haram that was on its back foot. The delay enabled Boko Haram to strategise, recruit new fighters, restart and sustain the war.
In conclusion, ending the war in the Lake Chad region will require an improvement in the military strength and security capabilities of the participating countries, most especially Nigeria which harbours the majority of the insurgents. Nigeria needs a coordinated fighting force, as well as military and political leadership, to take advantage of the current downgraded capabilities of the insurgent groups. Let’s strike with the metal is red hot.
Patrick O. Okigbo III & Ndubuisi N. Nwokolo
Okigbo III is the Founder and Principal Partner at Nextier while Dr. Nwokolo is the Senior Policy and Research Lead.
