Biowarfare and Africa: How prepared is the continent for a biological attack?

The global debate surrounding biological warfare has returned to the forefront of international security discussions. Advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence and genetic engineering have dramatically lowered barriers to manipulating pathogens. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how rapidly infectious diseases can overwhelm healthcare systems, disrupt economies and destabilise governments.

For Africa, the question is no longer whether biological threats are possible. The question is whether the continent is prepared to detect, contain and recover from a deliberate biological attack.

The answer is mixed.

Africa is considerably better prepared today than it was during the Ebola outbreaks of the early 2010s. The creation of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), improvements in disease surveillance and growing regional cooperation have strengthened the continent’s ability to respond to health emergencies. However, significant gaps remain in laboratory infrastructure, pharmaceutical manufacturing, military biodefense capabilities and public health funding.

The strategic challenge is that biological warfare does not resemble conventional warfare. A missile strike is visible. A tank invasion is obvious. A biological attack may initially appear indistinguishable from a natural disease outbreak.

This ambiguity makes biodefense one of the most complex security challenges of the twenty-first century.

 “Only a limited number of African countries currently possess such capabilities at scale. Expanding genomic sequencing networks may therefore be one of the most important investments Africa can make in biodefense.”

Why biowarfare matters

Biological warfare involves the deliberate release of bacteria, viruses, toxins or other biological agents to cause illness, death or economic disruption.

Historically, biological weapons programmes focused on agents such as anthrax, smallpox and plague. Today, advances in genetic engineering raise concerns that pathogens could potentially be modified to increase transmissibility, resistance to treatment or environmental persistence.

The danger is not limited to state actors.

Non-state groups, criminal organisations and terrorist networks increasingly have access to scientific knowledge and technologies that were once restricted to major powers. While developing a sophisticated biological weapon remains extremely difficult, the diffusion of biotechnology means the threat environment is becoming more complex.

For Africa, where public health systems vary widely in capability, even a limited biological incident could have disproportionate consequences.

Africa’s greatest strength: Public health experience

Paradoxically, one of Africa’s strongest biodefense advantages is its experience with infectious disease outbreaks.

The continent has confronted Ebola, Marburg virus, cholera, yellow fever, Lassa fever, monkeypox and COVID-19. These experiences have forced governments to develop surveillance systems, emergency response mechanisms and public health expertise that many regions lacked before the pandemic era.

The Africa CDC has emerged as a key institution in this regard. Created in 2017, the organisation coordinates disease surveillance, laboratory networks and emergency responses across member states. During COVID-19, it played a critical role in information sharing, testing strategies and procurement coordination.

In a biowarfare scenario, these same systems would form the first line of defence. The challenge is that public health preparedness remains uneven across the continent.

The surveillance gap

The first requirement for biological defence is early detection.

A biological attack can only be contained if authorities recognise it quickly. Many African countries rely on the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response framework, which collects health data from clinics, hospitals and laboratories. While effective in many contexts, surveillance coverage remains inconsistent.

Large rural populations, limited laboratory capacity and underfunded healthcare systems create blind spots. A deliberate biological attack may initially resemble a routine outbreak. Distinguishing between a natural epidemic and a weaponised pathogen requires advanced diagnostic capabilities, genomic sequencing and real-time epidemiological analysis.

Only a limited number of African countries currently possess such capabilities at scale. Expanding genomic sequencing networks may therefore be one of the most important investments Africa can make in biodefense.

Laboratories: The frontline of biosecurity

Laboratories are both a defence asset and a potential vulnerability.

Effective biodefense requires laboratories capable of safely handling dangerous pathogens. These facilities must meet internationally recognised biosafety standards.

Across Africa, the number of biosafety level 3 laboratories has increased significantly over the past decade. However, Biosafety Level 4 facilities—the highest category used for the world’s most dangerous pathogens—remain extremely limited.

This creates dependence on foreign partners for advanced research and diagnostics. It also raises concerns about response times during major emergencies. Beyond infrastructure, laboratory security is equally important. Strict controls over pathogen storage, inventory management and access procedures are essential to prevent theft, misuse or accidental release.

In an era of synthetic biology, laboratory biosecurity has become a national security issue.

The military’s role in biodefense

Biological threats blur the traditional distinction between public health and national security. As a result, military organisations play a critical role in biodefense. Across the world, armed forces maintain specialised Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) units designed to detect and respond to unconventional threats. In Africa, military involvement in outbreak response has expanded significantly following Ebola and COVID-19. The military’s primary contribution lies in logistics, mobility and command-and-control capabilities. During a biological emergency, armed forces can rapidly deploy personnel, establish field hospitals, enforce quarantine zones and transport medical supplies to remote areas.

Military laboratories can also assist in identifying unknown biological agents. More importantly, military intelligence services can monitor potential biological threats before they materialise.

This includes tracking extremist groups, monitoring illicit procurement networks and identifying suspicious research activities that could indicate biological weapons development. For many African countries, integrating military and civilian health capabilities remains a work in progress.

Vaccine independence as national security

One of the clearest lessons from COVID-19 was Africa’s dependence on foreign pharmaceutical supply chains. When vaccines became available, many African countries found themselves at the back of the queue. In a biological warfare scenario, such dependence could prove catastrophic. Biodefense is not simply about detecting threats. It is also about producing countermeasures quickly.

This is why vaccine manufacturing has increasingly become a strategic priority. Initiatives such as the Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing seek to increase local production capacity and reduce external dependence. The strategic logic is straightforward. Countries that cannot produce vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics remain vulnerable during crises. Medical manufacturing is therefore no longer just a health issue. It is a component of national resilience.

The legal and diplomatic dimension

Biological defence extends beyond laboratories and hospitals. International law remains an important deterrent. The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Nearly all African countries are parties to the treaty.

However, enforcement remains challenging because biological weapons programmes are inherently difficult to detect. African governments must therefore strengthen domestic legislation governing dangerous pathogens, dual-use research and laboratory security. Export controls on sensitive biological materials and equipment are equally important.

Preventing misuse is often easier than responding after an attack occurs.

The biggest weakness: Funding

Despite significant progress, Africa’s greatest biodefense vulnerability remains funding. Public health systems across much of the continent continue to face chronic resource constraints. Laboratories require maintenance. Surveillance systems require technology. Healthcare workers require training. Vaccine manufacturing requires substantial capital investment.

Many countries struggle to meet basic healthcare spending targets, let alone finance advanced biodefense capabilities. As a result, preparedness remains uneven. Some countries possess sophisticated outbreak response systems, while others continue to rely heavily on external support. This disparity creates vulnerabilities that could be exploited by biological threats.

Strategic conclusion

For Africa, the most effective defence against biological warfare is not a secret weapons programme or a specialised military unit. It is a strong public health system. The same capabilities required to defeat Ebola, COVID-19 and future pandemics are the capabilities needed to defeat biological attacks.

Disease surveillance, laboratory security, vaccine manufacturing, military logistics and regional cooperation form the foundation of modern biodefense.

The encouraging reality is that Africa has made significant progress over the past decade. The concerning reality is that biotechnology is advancing faster than many governments can adapt. For policymakers, the strategic lesson is clear: biological security can no longer be treated solely as a health issue. It is a national security issue, an economic issue and a geopolitical issue.

In the twenty-first century, the nations best prepared for biological warfare may not be those with the strongest militaries, but those with the strongest public health systems.