The recent security challenges across Nigeria’s different regions have led to the formation of regional security outfits, suggesting a move towards a more decentralised system, even if unintentional.
In the Southeast, Ebubeagu, and its Southwest counterpart, Amotekun, are examples of these regional networks created to protect residents when central assistance has been lacking. Amotekun, in particular, pioneered this contemporary approach.
However, it’s important to note that relying solely on police measures cannot address deep-seated issues like widespread unemployment, currently at a high 45% – one of the highest globally. Nonetheless, let’s explore how regional security outfits indicate a de facto move towards decentralisation.
While the Southwest has taken the lead in recent years, a historical perspective is informative. Western Nigeria has long advocated for state police, often met with indifference from the central government. The Odua People’s Congress (OPC), initially an activist group, evolved into a de facto regional security force.
Born in response to perceived issues with certain settler groups, the OPC later transitioned into providing security services like street patrol and conflict mediation.
However, concerns about armed herdsmen and subsequent attacks in southern Nigeria sparked public outrage and a renewed demand for a regional security force. In January 2020, a stakeholders’ meeting led to the establishment of Amotekun.
The federal government, through the Minister of Justice, initially deemed it illegal and unconstitutional, leading to tensions between the West and the centre. Eventually, caution prevailed, the federal government softened its stance, and Amotekun achieved its non-combat goals.
While some exceptions remain, a relative calm has settled over the Southwest compared to other regions. Notably, the initial enthusiasm for similar outfits in the Southeast, Middle Belt, and North diminished after meetings between the presidency and respective governors.
These moves towards regional security networks result not from wishful thinking but from the shortcomings of the Nigerian police force. Many argue that its allegiance lies with Abuja, not local authorities.
For instance, during the #EndSARS protests, the government’s response was predictable: disbandment of the unit and promises of reform. However, these measures rarely result in systemic change. This pattern has been consistent.
Since 1999, every police chief has ordered the dismantling of notorious police roadblocks, yet they persist nationwide, serving as tools for extortion and violence against unsuspecting Nigerians. The officers merely disappear temporarily, returning when public attention shifts.
Today, the Nigerian federation faces challenges. It has historically relied on oil revenue, contradicting federalism’s core principles where constituent units enjoy fiscal autonomy and contribute to the centre. This practice was implemented by the military, centralising oil revenue collection and subsequent redistribution. Consequently, states became almost entirely dependent on federal allocations for survival.
This fiscal centralization not only undermined federalism but also stripped states of control over their policing systems. The 1999 Constitution establishes a single “Nigeria Police Force,” controlled ultimately by the President, and explicitly prohibits any other police entities.
Yet, the persistent demand for state police, driven by the surge in violent crimes, highlights the shortcomings of the current system. We argue that the emergence of regional security outfits has inadvertently introduced a form of de facto federalism in policing, a potentially crucial development amidst Nigeria’s escalating security challenges.
