Beyond the price list: How Nigerians should judge economic pain, policy reform and government performance

The Price List Nigerians Trust

What is circulating in homes, WhatsApp groups and street-corner conversations is not just a political message; it is a household balance sheet written in plain language. On one side of the comparison is a May 29, 2023 memory: the naira around ₦460 to the dollar, petrol at about ₦197 per litre, cooking gas at roughly ₦570 per kilogram, a crate of eggs at about ₦2,500, and sachet water at about ₦150 per bag. On the other side is today’s lived reality, with much higher numbers attached to the same essentials. Using the benchmark figures in that viral comparison, the implied increases are staggering: the naira benchmark moved by about 204 percent, petrol by about 352 percent, cooking gas by about 111 percent, eggs by 140 percent and sachet water by about 167 percent. That is why the message resonates. It translates macroeconomics into kitchen economics. It is also why any government that dismisses this kind of public arithmetic is making a serious political mistake.

Getting the Timing and Measurement Right

The sentiment is valid, but we must also be precise about timing and method if we want a fair public judgment. First, Nigeria is not yet at a full three years from May 29, 2023; as of February 21, 2026, the administration is approaching its third anniversary, not past it. Second, the viral figures are best treated as household benchmark prices, not official national averages, because prices vary by location, market structure, quality and distribution costs. That said, the direction of change is unmistakable, and the broader macro story supports why Nigerians feel squeezed. Tinubu’s inauguration speech on May 29, 2023 included the now-famous declaration that “fuel subsidy is gone,” and Reuters reporting at the time reflected the ₦460 per dollar benchmark many people still cite from that transition period. The reforms that followed—fuel subsidy removal, foreign-exchange liberalisation and revenue mobilisation—were subsequently acknowledged by the IMF as major steps toward macroeconomic stabilisation.

Nigeria’s Reforms and a Global Cost-of-Living Context

Where the public conversation often becomes too narrow is in assuming that every price increase is uniquely Nigerian or entirely the result of one administration’s choices. Nigeria’s policy decisions clearly mattered, especially because subsidy removal and FX reforms can transmit directly into transport, energy and food prices. But the world has also been living through a prolonged cost shock, and households across both developed and developing countries have felt it in different ways. The IMF’s January 2026 World Economic Outlook update says global headline inflation is expected to decline from an estimated 4.1 percent in 2025 to 3.8 percent in 2026, which is good news on paper, but it does not mean prices return to old levels. It simply means the pace of increase is slowing. The World Bank’s commodity outlook also projects commodity prices to fall by about 7 percent in 2025 and another 7 percent in 2026, yet even that does not automatically restore affordability at the retail level when local taxes, logistics, currency pass-through and market inefficiencies remain in play.

What Developed Economies Also Teach Us

The evidence from advanced economies helps make this point. In the United Kingdom, official data showed consumer inflation at 3.4 percent in December 2025, with food and non-alcoholic beverage prices up 4.5 percent year-on-year, while diesel prices were still higher than a year earlier. In the euro area, Eurostat’s January 2026 flash estimate put annual inflation at 1.7 percent, lower than December’s 2.0 percent, but services inflation remained sticky enough that many households still felt everyday prices were high relative to incomes. In the United States, the BLS reported all-items CPI rose 2.7 percent in 2025, and food prices also increased, while the familiar egg-price volatility remained a recurring symbol of how one staple item can dominate public mood even when aggregate inflation moderates. The lesson is that disinflation is not relief in the way most citizens define relief. People do not celebrate “slower inflation” when their wage packet still buys less than it did two years earlier.

The Developing-Country Reality Is Similar

Developing economies offer a similar caution against simplistic comparisons. South Africa ended 2025 with inflation around 3.6 percent, according to Statistics South Africa, and even with comparatively better inflation control than many peers, housing, utilities and food still drove household pressure. Brazil’s official inflation also remained a live issue into 2026, with price pressures visible in electricity, gasoline and household consumption categories despite macro policy responses. In other words, governments can reduce inflation rates and still struggle with public anger because the cost base has already reset upward. This is exactly the point many policy conversations miss in Nigeria. The public is not only reacting to the latest monthly inflation reading; they are reacting to cumulative price changes over time. That cumulative burden is what shapes voting behaviour, consumer confidence, labour agitation and social trust. Nigerians are not wrong to focus on the market. They are doing what citizens everywhere do when economic policy arrives at the household doorstep.

From Price Snapshot to Real Performance Scorecard

There is, however, an important upgrade needed in how we evaluate a government. A price list is a powerful starting point, but it is not a sufficient scorecard. Good civic economics should ask not only whether petrol, gas, eggs and water became more expensive, but also whether wages rose, whether transport costs became more predictable, whether electricity supply improved enough to lower generator dependence, whether jobs and small-business turnover recovered, whether social transfers cushioned vulnerable households, and whether inflation is now on a durable downward path without simply masking reality through methodology debates. Nigeria’s January 2026 inflation reading of 15.10 percent, after the NBS CPI methodology update, was reported as easing, but many households still experience intense hardship because the cumulative spike from earlier months and years has not disappeared. Both can be true: macro indicators can improve while micro pain remains severe.

A Better Standard for Government and Citizens

This is where government communication and public accountability must mature. Policymakers should stop speaking only in percentages and begin speaking in household outcomes. Citizens, in turn, should resist both extremes: the comforting claim that “reforms always hurt, just wait,” and the equally shallow claim that “all pain proves total failure.” The better standard is sequencing, fairness and results. If reforms were necessary, were they properly timed? Were they transparently explained? Were the savings credibly redirected? Were the poorest protected? Did public services visibly improve? Did the state reduce waste while asking citizens to endure sacrifice? These are the questions that separate ideological debate from economic governance. The market woman’s price list is not anti-intellectual; it is the first draft of a national performance audit. But it becomes a stronger democratic instrument when combined with income trends, service delivery, employment conditions and policy credibility. Until then, Nigeria will continue to argue with two truths at once: reform may be necessary, and hardship may still be unacceptable.