Bad governance, insecurity behind tensions in ECOWAS region

Ambassador Abdel-Fatau Musah (PhD) was appointed as the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission in July 2022. Prior to his current position, Musah served as the Director, Western Africa Division, at the Department of Political and Peacebuilding and Peace Operations at the UN, where he coordinated the UN policy and peacebuilding strategies for the region. In an exclusive interview with BusinessDay’s Onyinye Nwachukwu and Ojochenemi Onje in Abuja, the Commissioner spoke on ongoing efforts to retain Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso in ECOWAS and the dire consequences on both sides if they finally choose to exit the bloc by the January 29, 2025 deadline.

On the exit of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, help us understand what the issues are and how they have unfolded.

Good governance and peace and security intersect. Coups in West Africa, particularly in Guinea and Mali, were driven by democratically elected presidents manipulating their constitutions for power. This led to coups and demonstrations in 2020. Countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger intervened in politics due to insecurity and terrorist attacks, accusing their governments of incapacity. The military intervened to resolve these issues. However, there have been shortcomings on both sides, with ECOWAS recognizing too many coups in the region, and the Niger coup being considered one too many.

The authority of the heads of state of West Africa, led by His Excellency Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who is the current chair of ECOWAS, said that this is enough; we are going to stop this. They were very determined to make sure that that coup does not succeed. And in dealing with that, I think probably the approach, even though the principle was correct, maybe left something to be desired. And looking at the global environment, anybody today who stages a coup will have supporters. In the past, the world was unipolar, allowing military support from other nations. Today, coups can gain support. However, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s actions were a knee-jerk reaction to past sanctions. They used this as an excuse to withdraw from the community, despite previous sanctions being imposed on member states. Both sides likely had shortcomings in their actions.

If you stage a coup, ECOWAS accompanies you to return the country to constitutional order as quickly as possible. And once you don’t do that, you are still suspended from decision-making instances of ECOWAS. ECOWAS removed all those harsh sanctions on Niger; why haven’t they reversed their decision? So many experts are also saying that it’s because ECOWAS will never allow military regimes to stay in perpetuity. And we have seen that in the past few months almost all the countries are saying they are going to stay in power for the next five years and that after this time, their presidents, leaders, will be eligible as candidates in the elections. These are two things that the ECOWAS protocol does not allow.

ECOWAS is working on counterterrorism efforts to address terrorism grievances, but withdrawing from the community is not justified. The supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance states that coups cannot be allowed to benefit anyone. This is because liberal democracy is not perfect and good governance deficits exist, but military coups are not the solution. The military in fragile countries may view coups as the shortest route to power, highlighting the need for a more balanced approach to governance.

How is ECOWAS working on issues around governance and insecurity to help forestall these kinds of situations that can really destabilise the region?

ECOWAS has been working to review its supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance over the past three years due to concerns about democratically elected presidents using constitutional reviews and manipulation of electoral norms to entrench themselves in power. The review aims to block loopholes, such as term limits affecting sitting presidents’ mandates. The judiciary has become the weakest link in the region’s separation of powers, with the executive and parliament being more or less balanced.

But when you come to the judiciary, it’s a different thing. In all the crises that we face in the region, the judiciary has been instrumentalized against opponents in order to maintain heads of state and presidents in power, probably even against the will of the people during the election. We are also working with partners to strengthen the independence and impartiality of the judiciary in the country. These are all weaknesses in our architecture that we need to resolve.

I’m just giving you these two examples on the normative side of trying to prevent the recurrence of bad governance. The other side of bad governance is that you can see from the upheavals in many of the countries about the very high levels of poverty. West Africa’s young population, comprising 60-70% of the population below 30, lacks future prospects. To address this, urgently create infrastructure and conditions for these young people to express themselves. They are smart and technically sound, and providing 24-hour electricity can help them take care of themselves. Other areas of focus include meaningful education, basic healthcare, infrastructure, electricity, and transport. Partnerships with the private sector can also promote employment in the country. These are areas of governance that need urgent attention.

On the side of security, what defines the security environment today is the asymmetric nature of the crisis characterised by terrorism and violent extremism. That is what has defined West Africa since about 2012. We know in Nigeria, Boko Haram has been there since about 2007. But Nigeria has been able to more or less manage the crisis, together within the Multinational Joint Task Force with countries like Cameroon, Chad, and others. Today, if you talk about banditry, kidnapping, and others, these are the dying truths of terrorism. Whether you are talking about the Islamic State for West Africa or the other branches of Al-Qaeda, ANSARU, and then others. They have lost their potential. I’m not saying they are dead. They’ve lost their potential to such an extent that Nigeria is able to manage the security environment.

The Sahel region is facing a combination of locally grown emerging terrorists and elements from the Middle East. The terrorism in Mali began with the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and the porous borders and proliferation of weapons make it easy for these groups to spread. The terrorism is now moving down to the coast, with recent attacks in Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. To counter this, ECOWAS heads of state have decided to activate a counter-terrorism force. The chiefs of defence staff have met to review the process for activating the force, with plans to raise 1,600 well-equipped forces. The ministers of finance will soon discuss funding options. The region will take the fight against terrorists, ensuring they are contained and destroyed before they contaminate the region.

We have terrorism in the Sahel, and then we’ve got drug trafficking, piracy, and human trafficking, occurring also in the Gulf of Guinea. So if we don’t act very fast, and then the terrorists in the Sahel join forces with the transnational organised crime networks in the Gulf of Guinea, then the region is doomed. Why the terrorists can recruit young people is because of marginalisation. There is also the need to resolve the issue of building internal cohesion so that young people can be given meaningful sources of survival so that they do not see foot soldiers in terrorism as an alternative. All those are underway, and ECOWAS is taking steps to confront the main causes of the governance challenges and also insecurity in the region.

“However, there have been shortcomings on both sides, with ECOWAS recognizing too many coups in the region, and the Niger coup being considered one too many.”

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Assuming Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso finally exit from ECOWAS, what would be the consequences on both sides of the divide?

We are family. The region is very integrated. You have about more than five million Burkina-based citizens in Côte d’Ivoire alone. You have citizens of Niger across the region, in Nigeria and other places. Burkina Faso, Mali, you have got so many of them all across the region, and that is due to the ECOWAS Free Movement and then the ability to settle in any member states and start a business without all the encumbrances, like going to have a resident permit, pay exorbitant taxes, and so on. We are family in the region, and we are destined to stay together with them, so our priority is that our brothers and sisters in these great countries reverse their decision, and we are working towards that.

The last summit of ECOWAS appointed a mediator in the person of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye of Senegal to work on this, so there are many back-channel approaches in order to convince them that our future is bound together. Our differences should not be for us to separate, and that is why, at the last meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, we invited all of them, but so far, I think the bad blood has gone too deep, but I can already see some signs that these differences can be resolved. We still have our doors open. We tell them that they are our brothers, we are not enemies, and we have to work together. When the terrorist groups attacked the Malian forces the other day, ECOWAS came out with a very strong statement, condemning it. There is this kind of solidarity that ECOWAS is expressing towards them—that we are not enemies. But if, and it’s a big if, they decide that their future belongs elsewhere, ECOWAS is also a community of solidarity.

International relations require blocks to support each other, and citizens of Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger need the support and solidarity of the rest to apply for positions in international organizations like the African Union or the United Nations. If these countries leave, it will be more difficult diplomatically and diminish ECOWAS’ reach. Intra-West African trade is small, with only 11% of the region’s trade with the rest of the world. ECOWAS has been promoting industrialization through the common external tariff, adding value to primary products and promoting diversity in production. However, the balance of trade is not in their favour, and it is important for them to be part of the whole to benefit. ECOWAS is pushing for reconciliation by rebuilding broken bridges between countries, ensuring that they can benefit from the benefits of the region.

The current situation in the region is untenable, as the three countries together have greater GDP and occupy about 54% of the region’s landmass. ECOWAS aims to move the region from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people, and they are planning a major summit to strategize on the future of regional integration. The global environment has changed dramatically, and ECOWAS needs to reposition itself. The issue of terrorism is a defining factor, and the region is turning into an arena of superpower confrontations, which ECOWAS wants to avoid. The crisis in northern Mali, where Ukraine supported the other side due to Russia’s support, is a defining factor that ECOWAS wants to avoid, as it could extend to other places, similar to the Cold War.

What other strategies are being deployed to get them back?

Mali has got a lot of businessmen. If you go to Mali, for example, one of the key businessmen has got a hotel chain all over the region called Azalai.

Businessmen like that are going to be very seriously impacted when these countries withdraw, because all the disadvantages that I mentioned before will apply to them in terms of doing business in other countries. Azalai has chains all over the region. There is also the business community. There is the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, we have met, and they are determined also to add their voice from the business angle that this is going to be disastrous for business if this happens. There are women organisations that want to also intervene. There are many back-channel moves that I cannot elaborate on because the confidentiality of them is also important in order to ensure their success. So I can assure you that the mediator is the official representative of the ECOWAS community in the official engagement with them, but there are also so many behind the scenes. And if you have been following, President Diomaye Faye also appointed his own special envoy, who would be the one dealing with them directly in the person of a very renowned professor and a political heavyweight in the region, in the person of Professor Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal, who is also working behind the scenes to deal with that. I can tell you that it is a multi-layered approach to them; it is not in the interest of ECOWAS or in the interest of the countries to be talking about this in the media, but things are ongoing.

What if the three countries still refuse to rejoin the bloc?

I don’t want to even believe that things will fail. I am very confident, very optimistic that we are going to be together sooner or later. The doors of ECOWAS will always remain open. In the worst-case scenario, ECOWAS may not reconcile with the three countries creating their association, the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES). The region has numerous river basin groups, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire, which are part of ECOWAS. The Liptako Gourma Authority has been a guiding force, bringing these countries together. The AES, built on the foundations of the Lpitako Gourma Union, is not contradictory to their membership in ECOWAS. ECOWAS has lived with other countries and blocs for several years, learning from their experiences. Mauritania, Morocco, and Morocco have all applied to rejoin ECOWAS. Despite challenges and weaknesses, the movement is forward, and it is better for all to come together to maintain continental unity, rather than splintering at the bloc level. This will help maintain the community spirit in the region. But if nothing works, according to the treaty that established ECOWAS in 1975, a member state that wants to withdraw from the community will have to give 12-month notice. And that 12-month notice expires on the 29th of January next year.

So we still got a few months of negotiations and back-channel negotiations to make sure that things happen. After the 29th of January, according to the ECOWAS treaty, we have to take steps to see how the divorce can be as painless as possible for both sides. And so the authority, the heads of state, and the government of the region have also directed the ECOWAS commission to work out contingency plans. That is also underway. We are not just waiting until after the 29th of January; we are already developing the options, the alternatives on how to approach future relations with the three countries if they leave eventually.

Can you speak to the ECOWAS single currency, the Eco project? Why is it taking so much to materialise?

Eco has become a shifting target since its inception, and the plans to get it going. But what I will tell you is that we have a very difficult situation in the region. West Africa is divided roughly into two blocks. One that uses the French CFA, and then the group of other countries that use their own currencies in the region.

So the approach was that the second block, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, and others, should create another block to move towards the single currency. And then, at some point, when the convergence criteria are met, the Eco becomes the common currency. And we have seen that it is not that simple. It’s also very political, because if you look at the very infrastructure of the French CFA, it has got an external power also involved that will not let go easily because of the benefits for that external power. So you have to balance that with the other criteria. I believe, personally, that if we are going to wait for all the macroeconomic conditions to converge and other things, the shifting target will continue. I believe, personally, I’m not speaking this time on behalf of ECOWAS, that there must be a political decision to decree Eco into being. And then those that are ready will join while others can come in later. If you want all the members to meet the criteria before you bring Eco into being, it’s going to be very difficult because the economic conditions in the member states are very different. Nigeria constitutes, let’s say, about 70 percent to 80 percent of the whole economy of the region. And you don’t want Nigeria to unnecessarily lose by absorbing weaker economies with weaker currencies that would drag down the Naira further. Nigeria will have to take a political decision. The Francophone countries are using the Franc CFA because it has been artificially pegged to the Euro, and that is a political decision.