The internecine fighting in Libya is often reduced to east versus west: Khalifa Haftar, the warlord who controls the former, against a United Nations-backed government in the latter. But this year’s most important fighting is some 600km south of the capital, Tripoli. Last month General Haftar sent his Libyan National Army (lna) to pacify Fezzan, a vast expanse of desert plagued by ethnic and tribal feuds. It has already taken the town of Sabha, home to perhaps one-fifth of the area’s population. Now it is fighting for a bigger prize 200km to the south-west: the Sharara oilfield.
Before going offline in December it pumped 315,000 barrels per day (b/d). That was about a third of the country’s output, which had been at a five-year high. Then the tribesmen tasked with guarding the facility took it over to demand better pay. The closure mothballed the nearby “Elephant” oilfield, which relies on Sharara for electricity. That took another 73,000 b/d out of production.
After brief skirmishes the lna says it has retaken the field. It promises to let the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation resume control and restart production.
But it will still hold the territory around the field. The lna already controls the Sirte basin, home to most of Libya’s oil reserves, and the coastline near Ras Lanuf, where its export terminals are located. Last summer it seized those terminals and tried to redirect their revenues to a rival oil company in Benghazi. It backed down after America and the eu threatened to impose sanctions and stop buying Libyan oil. With Iran under sanctions and Venezuela in chaos, though, General Haftar may come to view that as an empty threat. The un hopes to organise elections and a constitutional convention this year (though it had the same goal in 2018). General Haftar’s control of oil resources gives him leverage over the rival government, which barely controls Tripoli.
The lna insists this is not a power grab, but rather an effort to rid southern Libya of foreign mercenaries. Hundreds of militants from neighbouring Chad are fighting in the area and preying on locals. The mayor of Sabha describes his town as “under occupation” by foreign militias. Yet the lna is not entirely made up of Libyans, either. It fights alongside militiamen from Darfur, mostly offshoots of the Sudan Liberation Army, a rebel group that splintered after it struck a peace agreement with the government in Khartoum in 2006.
Few of these foreigners have ideological affinity with any of Libya’s warring sides. The country’s vast desert provides an ungoverned space in which they can hide and regroup—and make money. Benghazi’s main jihadist militia pays a recruitment fee of $3,000 per foreign fighter, according to the un. Others follow the Fezzan’s long and lucrative tradition of smuggling. A litre of subsidised petrol that costs 10 us cents in Libya fetches ten times as much in Chad. Since the overthrow in 2011 of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya’s dictator, smugglers have made money moving people as well as fuel, taking them north to the Mediterranean and onwards to Europe. Drugs are big business, too. Foreigners now take a cut, either trafficking goods and people themselves or, more often, intercepting convoys and demanding payment.
The instability this causes is being felt across the region. Earlier this month Chadian rebels used Libya as a base from which to launch a coup against Idriss Déby, Chad’s president. It was thwarted with the help of French air power (see article). Sudanese militants, meanwhile, have used their new-found wealth to buy dozens of 4x4s which they too may use to fight their own government. The influx of foreigners is a problem for Libya. It is one for their home countries as well.
