To many southerners, the coup was a welcome end to northern domination. To many Northerners meanwhile, it seemed a prelude to the Igbo domination they had long feared. Four of the five majors who led the coup were Igbo
Last series, we discussed the 1962-63 census controversies which after all said and done, showed the north with 29.7 million of Nigeria’s 55.6 million-strong population at the time. This meant the north kept its majority 174 of 312 available seats in the federal parliament.
In the first years of independence, Ahmadu Bello’s Northern People’s Congress (NPC) ruled Nigeria in coalition with Nnamdi Azikiwe’s National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) party. However, by 1963, the coalition had begun to fragment. With Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group (AG) party now virtually decimated and Awo in prison for treason, Bello and his NPC colleagues knew they had a ready southern partner in the new political boss of the west – Samuel Akintola, the region’s premier. This emboldened NPC’s northern politicians, many of who had never liked Igbos in the first place, to start treating NCNC politicians as irrelevant.
As a result of their lowly status in the governing coalition, the experience of the 1962-63 census fiascos and upcoming federal elections in 1964, NCNC thus decided to team up with what was left of its former bitter rival, AG, as well as with some northern minority parties to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). UPGA presented itself as an alternative to Hausa-Fulani domination of the federal government. Its main goal was to wrest control of the centre from NPC, rendering the stakes high for Bello’s party, which faced potential national-level marginalisation if UPGA triumphed.
Bello announced his party would have no further dealings of any sort with NCNC because “the Igbos have never been true friends of the north and never will be.” Predictably, he joined forces with Akintola’s new political vehicle, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and a few other small southern parties to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). NNA’s objective was simple: maintain the status quo at the centre with Bello’s NPC in charge and a junior southern coalition partner, this time Akintola and his party.
The 1964 federal election was characterised by ethnic-baiting and electoral malpractices of all sorts. A 1964 The Times editorial described the campaign thus:
“Party manifestos have long since been forgotten in the heat of the battle. The overwhelming emphasis laid by all campaigners on tribal and regional disputes and prejudices indicate the real points at issue. The Northerners are concentrating their fire on fears of everyone else of ‘Ibo domination’, wooing Yorubas of Western Region by playing on their dislike of the Ibos and arguing that victory for Akintola’s NNDP would ensconce Yoruba influence in the government whereas votes for the Action Group merely tie the divided Yoruba people to the chariot wheels of Ibo aggrandizement.”
At a rally in October 1964, Bello said NCNC wanted Igbos “to dominate the rest of Nigeria.” After the break-down of the NPC-NCNC coalition, Igbos thus resumed their role as the primary enemy of the north.
Using their power at the federal level, Bello’s NNA deployed intimidation tactics against UPGA politicians who were sometimes physically prevented from entering the north to campaign or even being able to register their candidacy. Meanwhile, in the west, Akintola put in place the machinery required to rig the election on behalf of NNA. Commenting on the 1964 campaign in the west, Guardian stated:
“An unpopular [Akintola-led] government regarded by many people as stooges of the North must try to cajole or to threaten the population to vote for it. A system of creating private armies of thugs under the name of ‘party stalwarts’ is in place. They are on the payroll of the party; they are mobilized, and they are armed with knives and guns. Their job is to break up rival party meetings and intimidate the population in general. Thugs beat up opposition leaders or members methodically. It is public knowledge how the elections are to be rigged. Voters are instructed not to put their [ballot] papers in the ballot box but to hide them. They are told to hand the paper to the head of their compound. He, in turn, is expected to deliver all the ballot papers of his compound to a party official who will then put several hundred papers into the Government box.”
Ultimately, 88 of 174 seats were declared “unopposed” in the north after local officials hindered the registration of UPGA candidates. Meanwhile, Akintola declared 30 percent of seats in the west unopposed using similar tactics.
Frustrated, southern UPGA leaders called for a boycott of the election. However, voting went ahead in many places and NNA declared victory. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa called on Azikiwe – Nigeria’s ceremonial president since it became a constitutional republic in 1963 – to invite the creation of a government. Zik refused at first due to the events surrounding the election. Ultimately, he relented, and the Bello-led NNA claimed 198 of 312 seats in the federal assembly, going on to form a national government. However, many southern politicians did not accept what they considered a sham of an election.
The western regional elections of 1965 followed a similar pattern to the 1964 national poll. Akintola’s NNDP party deployed blatant ethnic-baiting, stating that if elected, they would make sure “Yorubas shall never be slaves”, which implied the opposite might be the case if UPGA, which had many Igbo politicians, won power in the west. Again, everything was done to hinder the registration of UPGA candidates. After the vote, both sides declared victory. UPGA leaders were arrested for disregarding the official results. Subsequently, western Nigeria became a battle-zone with widespread riots and clashes with police. By now, many Nigerians were fed up with the political system.
It was in this atmosphere of chaos and violence that the January 1966 coup was launched. Its leaders assassinated those they held primarily responsible for the 1964 and 1965 election fiascos: NPC leader Ahmadu Bello, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and Premier Samuel Akintola, among others. But the coup ultimately failed because the plotters failed to seize the capital, Lagos. In effect, the highest-ranking military officer at the time, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi took over as Head of State.
To many southerners, the coup was a welcome end to northern domination. To many Northerners meanwhile, it seemed a prelude to the Igbo domination they had long feared. Four of the five majors who led the coup were Igbo. No top Igbo politician was killed while the north’s two most important leaders – Bello and Balewa – were assassinated. President Azikiwe happened to be abroad during the coup for “medical reasons,” an explanation many northerners doubted. Instead, they believed that because he was Igbo, Zik had been warned about the coup and hence left the country. An Igbo, Ironsi, was now Head of State.
Further aggravating northerners in the subsequent months was the fact that though the coup leaders had been arrested, Ironsi seemed in no hurry to try them for treason. All this in combination with some of Ironsi’s decisions led Northern officers to start plotting a revenge coup, what would become known as the “July Rematch.” However, the immediate events leading up to this we shall discuss in the next series. Till then, take care folks!
