In our history series today, we look at how the politics of the years 1960-1963 set the stage for the ethnic strife that led Nigeria to a brutal civil war just seven years into independence. As we discussed last series, Ahmadu Bello’s Northern People’s Congress (NPC) emerged victorious from the 1959 parliamentary elections, eventually forging a coalition government with Nnamdi Azikiwe’s National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in which NPC was the senior partner.
Emboldened by victory, Bello started asserting his impending personal domination of Nigeria. In a December 1959 speech, he announced that just like his great-grandfather Usman dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, had divided the empire between his brother and eldest son for them to govern, “I too will divide this country between my two trustworthy lieutenants.”
The historical analogy suggested Bello wished to view the Nigerian state as a historical continuation of the Sokoto Caliphate with himself in the role of contemporary Usman dan Fodio. His speech fuelled existing fears of impending northern domination. In response, Awolowo’s Action Group (AG) declared they had taken note “of the statement made by the leader of the NPC, Sir Ahmadu Bello to the effect that he intended to divide Nigeria into North and South and then rule the two parts: from Sokoto through his lieutenants, in much the same way as his great-grandfather ruled the Fulani Empire.” This left in no doubt plans for Fulani domination of Nigeria, AG argued. In his 1960 autobiography, Awo stated Bello and his party were determined to make southerners “live in permanent subordination” to them.
Fanfare and joy at Britain’s departure aside, it was in this atmosphere of fear and mistrust that Nigeria became an independent country on October 1, 1960.
In their book, “A history of Nigeria”, Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton aptly describe Nigeria as a “state without a nation” at independence.
“The underlying cause of all the problems Nigeria experienced in the 1960s and has experienced since then is the “national question.” What is Nigeria? Who are Nigerians?” they stated. Falola and Heaton also argued that, “the regional and federal emphasis of the constitutions of the 1950s undermined the development of a unifying national consciousness by determining that access to power at the national level was to be derived from holding power at the regional level.”
Meanwhile, at the regional level, political domination by Yorubas, Igbos and Hausa-Fulanis left ethnic minorities feeling alienated from the political process, fostering further subdivisions of identity and rendering virtually impossible the already uphill task of building a sense of national we-ness. Thus, while many cultural elites like Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe made spirited attempts to encourage a pan-Nigerian consciousness in the 1960s, they failed largely due to the politics of power consolidation at the regional level by any means necessary.
On paper, the political system seemed fair and reasonable. Technically, the opposition had a chance to win power in future elections. In practice, this likelihood was rather fictional. With federal power came the power of patronage; federal jobs, decisions over industry-location, over who would get scholarships and how resources would be allocated.
Aside this, the chances of a party winning an election outside its regional stronghold were illusory because regional governments had the power and will to manipulate the election process. The politics of early independence Nigeria were thus dominated by corruption, election rigging, ethnic baiting and violence.
By 1962, even Zik’s NCNC was feeling marginalized by the dominant NPC despite being in government with it. That same year, a crisis erupted in Awo’s party. A faction in AG believed the party, and Yorubas in general, were losing too much being in opposition at the federal level and should reach out to Bello’s NPC for access to resources. This faction included Samuel Akintola, Awo’s successor as western premier after the latter resigned the post to lead AG in the 1959 elections.
Awo disagreed, arguing the western region should focus on economic self-sufficiency, reduce its dependence on the federal government and thus render NPC irrelevant to the future of the Yorubas. He then tried to remove Akintola as regional premier. But Akintola refused to budge and violence erupted in an ensuing power struggle.
Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, happy to weaken AG, declared a state of emergency in the west, suspending the AG-controlled regional government for six months. After this, Akintola was reinstated as premier, this time under the auspices of United Peoples’ Party (UPP), a new political outfit which formed a coalition with NCNC in the western assembly. Action Group thus became an opposition party in its former stronghold. Awo was accused of plotting to overthrow the government by violent means and charged with treasonable felony. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in 1963.
Aside this, the chances of a party winning an election outside its regional stronghold were illusory because regional governments had the power and will to manipulate the election process. The politics of early independence Nigeria were thus dominated by corruption, election rigging, ethnic baiting and violence
Meanwhile, ethnic tensions were growing at the federal level as southerners became increasingly resentful of NPC policies. In 1961, it was decided 50 percent of all military officers would be northerners regardless of their qualifications vis-à-vis their southern compatriots. Southerners became increasingly frustrated with a federal system that prioritised ethnicity over merit. Also, the bulk of development, health and education funds went to the north. Northern leaders justified this by arguing their region needed to catch up with the south following its underdevelopment during the colonial era.
By 1962, many southern leaders believed the only way to reduce NPC’s power was via a census scheduled that year. At the time, the number of seats allocated to regions in the federal legislature was based on population figures from 1953. Southern governments decided to manipulate the 1962 census results so their regions could gain seats and reverse the northern advantage. The initial figures showed an improbable 70 percent increase in the south’s population since 1953, compared to a 30 percent increase in the north. This now gave the south the population majority. NPC rejected the figures as fraudulent, calling for a new census.
Predictably, the 1963 result showed significant population gains for the north, in turn decried as fraudulent by the south. The difference was that NPC had the power to make the 1963 figures official. Akintola, now an NPC ally, accepted the results on behalf of the west. Dennis Osadebey, premier of the newly-created mid-west region, also accepted the results “for the sake of national unity.” The 1963 figures had Nigeria’s population at 55.6 million, of which a majority (29.7m) lived in the north. Federal representation thus continued to favour the north with all its implications.
We see here how population numbers have played a crucial role in the power games of Nigerian politics from way back. It is no coincidence that no one really knows how many Nigerians there are today. Next series, we shall look at how the census fiascos of 1962-63 set the stage for the massive rigging, large-scale violence and ethnic strife that characterised the first national election organised in independent Nigeria in 1964. From then on, it was just a matter of time and circumstance before civil war erupted.
