The Lakurawa threat: Time to wake up from our intelligence and security comatose

The Lakurawa terror group has emerged as a significant threat to the stability of North West Nigeria, exploiting weak intelligence frameworks, porous borders, and socio-economic vulnerabilities to wreak havoc on communities in mainly parts of Kebbi and Sokoto State. Despite their growing menace and alleged affiliations with global jihadist networks like the Islamic State, Nigeria’s intelligence and security apparatus has remained largely reactive and fragmented. This “intelligence and security comatose” has emboldened the group, allowing them to expand their operations and destabilise the region further. Now is the time for decisive action to wake up from this inertia, strengthen our counter-terrorism strategies, and implement robust, proactive measures. By leveraging modern intelligence tools, fostering collaboration across government levels, and addressing the socio-economic drivers of extremism, Nigeria can effectively confront the Lakurawa threat and restore peace to affected regions.

Origins of the Lakurawas in Northwest Nigeria

The Lakurawas are a radical terror group in North West Nigeria’s complex security landscape particularly in parts of Sokoto and Kebbi State. The term “Lakurawa” may have originated from the french word “la recrue” meaning the recruit. It is used by locals of communities in parts of Sokoto and Kebbi to describe itinerant groups, who were initially nomadic herders, but subsequently engaged in proselytisation and more recently armed radicalised groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) who enforce their brand of Islam and were predisposed to targeting and attacking mainly security forces and communities who resisted them. These groups, believed to have originated from across the Sahel, particularly Mali, primarily operate in rural and forested areas, exploiting weak state presence and governance vacuums.

In 2018, communities in parts of Gudu and Tanghaza Local Government Areas of Sokoto State reported to the State authorities of the presence of armed herdsmen suspected to be Malians whom they referred to as “Lakurawa” that had converged in Marake Forest in Gudu Local Government Area and Wassaniya, Tunigara, Moliava, Jina-Jincti villages in Tangaza Local Government Area both of Sokoto state.

The then Police Commissioner in Sokoto State, Murtala Mani issued a statement where he discountenanced any concern regarding the presence of the group. According to him, “intelligence gathered from competent authorities of the area” indicated that the herdsmen were annual visitors to the nearby forests bordering the two local government area with their cattle, but that the number of the cattle increased exponentially this year, to about 3000 from the usual figures of about 500 to 700. He explained that the herdsmen usually stay in the forest in Niger Republic whenever they embark on such annual movement but occasionally enter the villages of Gudu and Tanghaza LGAs to procure food and other essentials before returning to the forest in Niger Republic.

“By leveraging modern intelligence tools, fostering collaboration across government levels, and addressing the socio-economic drivers of extremism, Nigeria can effectively confront the Lakurawa threat and restore peace to affected regions.”

Despite these reports indicating that the groups were rejected by communities in Gada and Tanghaza LGAs, some component of the academia site research work by Professor Murtala Rufai of the Usman Danfodio University Sokoto and security forces, which indicated that the Lakurawas were invited to the locations by the District Head of Balle in Gudu Local Government together with the District Head of Gongono in Tanghaza LGAs with the support of the then Chairman of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) Alhaji Bello Wamakko to help the communities fend off marauding bandits from Zamfara State.

There are reports that indicate that the Lakurawas fought and drove away bandits from some of these communities but other indications are that they also collaborated with them in some instances.

The key factors behind their emergence include:

1. Historical marginalisation: Many members of Lakurawa groups hail from nomadic or semi-nomadic communities, particularly the Fulani. Across the sahel, over decades, conflicts over land use, cattle grazing, and water resources have fueled tensions between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, creating a fertile ground for armed uprisings.

2. Economic drivers: Widespread poverty and limited access to livelihoods have incentivised criminal activities as a means of survival or enrichment.

3. Weak governance and policing: Limited state control in rural areas, compounded by ineffective law enforcement, has allowed these groups to grow with impunity.

4. Regional instability and proliferation of arms: The Sahel region has seen significant arms trafficking due to ongoing conflicts in countries like Libya, Mali, and Niger. The Lakurawa have benefited from this proliferation, enabling them to acquire sophisticated weaponry.

Affiliations with terror groups in the Sahel

The Lakurawas do not function as a monolithic entity but rather as a network of loosely affiliated groups. The nexus between Lakurawas and other terror groups in the Sahel are sometimes driven by mutual interests where we increasingly monitor terrorist groups often exploiting local banditry networks for logistics, intelligence, and funds. In return, they provide arms, ideological support, or safe havens). Additionally the criminal and ideological disposition of the groups present blurred lines. While not all Lakurawas are ideologically driven, the overlap of their activities with those of other terrorist groups makes it challenging to distinguish between purely criminal and extremist motives.

The affiliations of the Lakurawa terror group with other terror organisations in the Sahel are likely influenced by strategic, ideological, and operational considerations. While specific intelligence on Lakurawa’s linkages may not be widely available, the following points explore plausible connections and affiliations based on patterns observed among extremist groups operating in the Sahel region:

1. Ideological affiliations

· Shared Islamist extremism: Lakurawa may share ideological frameworks with prominent Sahelian groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Such shared beliefs in establishing Sharia governance or opposing Western influence often serve as a basis for collaboration or mutual recognition.

2. Operational collaboration

· Resource and knowledge sharing: Lakurawa might receive training, funding, or resources from established Sahelian groups. This could include weapons smuggling, operational tactics, or explosives expertise.

· Joint operations: In some cases, groups collaborate on attacks to enhance their impact or signal strength to adversaries, particularly against military targets or local governments.

3. Financial networks

· Funding channels: Groups like AQIM and ISGS have robust revenue streams from kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and illicit trade. Lakurawa may tap into these networks for financial support in exchange for local logistical support or allegiance.

· Illicit trade: The Sahel is a hotspot for trafficking in arms, drugs, and people. Lakurawa could act as a local intermediary or partner for Sahelian groups engaging in these activities.

4. Territorial coordination

· Safe havens: With its proximity to the Sahel, the North-West of Nigeria could serve as a safe haven or fallback area for Sahelian militants fleeing military pressure in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger. Lakurawa could provide sanctuary in exchange for resources or operational support.

5. Recruitment and propaganda

· Recruitment networks: Lakurawa may leverage Sahel-based recruitment pipelines to attract fighters, particularly disillusioned youth, mercenaries, or other marginalised individuals.

· Cross-group propaganda: By affiliating with larger Sahelian groups, Lakurawa could amplify its legitimacy and propaganda reach, drawing more recruits or funding.

6. Rivalries or competition

While affiliations are common, terror groups in the Sahel sometimes compete for resources, recruits, or ideological supremacy. Lakurawa might either avoid or clash with other groups depending on overlapping operational interests.

“The nexus between Lakurawas and other terror groups in the Sahel are sometimes driven by mutual interests where we increasingly monitor terrorist groups often exploiting local banditry networks for logistics, intelligence, and funds.”

While many operate as independent ideological oriented criminal enterprises, there is growing evidence of interactions between some Lakurawa factions and terrorist groups active in the Sahel region, including:

1. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS): ISGS operates in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Some reports suggest logistical and operational collaborations between ISGS and criminal groups in North West Nigeria, including arms trading and revenue sharing from kidnappings.

2. ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province): Though historically focused in the Lake Chad Basin, factions of ISWAP have extended influence into Northwestern Nigeria, leveraging alliances with local bandit groups to expand their reach and sustain operations.

3. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) Interaction: Although JNIM is primarily an Al-Qaeda affiliate, some of its factions may collaborate temporarily with IS-affiliated groups for shared objectives.

4. Local Militias: Small armed groups or militias in the Sahel sometimes pledge loyalty to IS for access to resources or legitimacy, though their formal ties may be limited.

Implications for regional security

The Lakurawas represent a hybrid threat—a convergence of local criminality and transnational terrorism. Their interactions with terror groups in the Sahel region pose significant risks to regional stability, necessitating coordinated responses that address both governance deficits and transnational security dynamics.

Here are some of the implications:

Increased regional instability

· Amplification of violence: Lakurawa could exacerbate violence in a region already grappling with militant activities by groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Boko Haram.

· Cross-border insurgency: The porous borders of Sahel countries (e.g., Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso) allow easy movement of militants, weapons, and contraband, spreading the group’s influence and destabilising neighbouring states.

Strain on weak governance and security forces

Many Sahelian states have fragile institutions and poorly resourced security apparatuses. Lakurawa’s activities could overwhelm their capacities, further weakening governance and creating power vacuums for other militant groups to exploit.

Humanitarian crisis

· Increased violence from Lakurawa would likely displace more civilians, exacerbating the region’s already critical refugee and internal displacement crisis. This could strain resources and destabilise host communities.

Collaboration with or rivalry among extremist groups

· Potential alliances: Lakurawa may align with groups like AQIM or ISGS, bolstering their operational capabilities and expanding their reach.

· Rivalries and fragmentation: Alternatively, competition for resources, recruits, or territory could spark infighting, leading to unpredictable spikes in violence.

Economic impacts

· Persistent insecurity disrupts trade routes, agriculture, and resource extraction industries, deepening poverty and unemployment. These economic challenges can, in turn, fuel recruitment into terror groups, creating a vicious cycle.

Challenges to regional cooperation

· Multinational regional counterterrorism efforts in the ECOWAS subregion and the Sahel such as the now collapsed G5 and MNJTF, which are already challenged, will face additional challenges coordinating operational responses due to political instability and resource limitations. Lakurawa’s emergence could test these mechanisms further.

Influence of external actors

· Lakurawa’s rise may attract attention from international stakeholders (e.g., France, the U.S., or Russia), potentially altering the dynamics of foreign military and counterterrorism interventions in the Sahel.

Their size and threat

While precise figures on their exact number are elusive (unsubstantiated reports suggest an initial 200 to 1000), the Lakurawa have become a significant force in the region. Their growing influence and capabilities pose a serious security threat to the North West and Nigeria at large.

Modus operandi

The Lakurawa terror group in North West Nigeria, given its affiliation with the Islamic State (IS), operates with strategies and tactics that mirror IS’s established modus operandi globally, while adapting to the local dynamics of the region. Below are some of their methods including those that they could use in the future if they are not checked:

1. Asymmetric warfare

· Guerrilla tactics: Like other IS affiliates, Lakurawa is likely to engage in hit-and-run attacks on security forces, ambushes, and sabotage operations to destabilise the region.

· Targeting weak spots: They focus on isolated or poorly defended military posts, rural communities, and transportation routes.

2. Terrorising civilians

· Mass killings and attacks on villages: Lakurawa likely targets vulnerable villages, especially those perceived as collaborating with government forces, to spread fear and assert dominance.

· Sexual violence and abduction: Abductions, especially of women and children, may be used for enslavement, recruitment, or ransom.

3. Use of propaganda

· IS-Style messaging: Lakurawa likely produces videos or uses social media to broadcast its activities, emphasising its connection to the Islamic State to legitimise itself and recruit fighters.

· Religious messaging: Propaganda may exploit religious sentiments, presenting their actions as part of a divine struggle or jihad.

4. Recruitment and radicalisation

· Targeting marginalised communities: Lakurawa might exploit socio-economic grievances, particularly among disillusioned or impoverished youth, to recruit fighters.

· Religious indoctrination: Leveraging Islamic teachings, they distort scripture to justify their violent ideology and attract followers.

· Coercion: In some cases, forced recruitment or abduction of young men and boys may bolster their ranks.

5. Economic and resource exploitation

· Control of Resources: Lakurawa may seize farmland, livestock, and other local resources to fund operations.

· Taxation and Extortion: They likely impose taxes on communities under their control or demand protection money from traders.

· Ransom and Smuggling: Kidnapping for ransom and participating in smuggling (e.g., arms, drugs, or humans) could form a significant part of their revenue streams.

6. Suicide Bombings and IEDs (yet to be deployed)

· Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): Like IS affiliates globally, Lakurawa have the capacity and may employ IEDs in attacks on military convoys, markets, or other crowded areas.

· Suicide Bombings: They potentially could recruit individuals for suicide missions to inflict maximum casualties and attract media attention.

7. Collaboration with IS affiliates

· Operational Support: Lakurawa receive training, weapons, or tactical advice from Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) or IS West Africa Province (ISWAP).

· Cross-Border Operations: Exploiting Nigeria’s proximity to Sahelian countries, Lakurawa collaborates with other IS-linked groups for logistics or safe havens.

8. Territorial control and parallel governance

· Establishing “Caliphates”: Following the IS model, Lakurawa are already attempting to seize and govern territories, imposing strict Sharia law.

· Civil Services: In controlled areas, they attempt to provide basic services or impose their judicial system to win over or coerce local populations.

9. Targeting state and religious institutions

· Security Forces: Frequent attacks on police stations, military posts, and checkpoints are likely.

· Religious Leaders: Lakurawa may assassinate or intimidate clerics and traditional leaders who oppose their ideology.

10. Use of fear and symbolism

· Public Executions: They may conduct gruesome executions (e.g., beheadings) and broadcast them to instil fear and signal their power.

· Destruction of Cultural Sites: Targeting symbolic structures, such as churches or mosques, could serve to intimidate communities and assert dominance.

A failure of intelligence or action?

The emergence of the Lakurawa can be attributed to a combination of factors, including intelligence failures, operational shortcomings, and a deteriorating security situation. Intelligence agencies may have been slow to recognise the growing threat posed by the group. Additionally, the government’s response to insecurity in the region is generally inappropriate, inadequate and often reactive.

Intelligence failures:

• Lack of Proactive Intelligence: The absence of proactive intelligence gathering and analysis has hindered the timely identification and assessment of emerging threats, including the Lakurawa.

• Ineffective Intelligence Sharing: Inefficient intelligence sharing mechanisms between security agencies have hampered the coordination of efforts to counter the group.

Operational shortcomings:

• Poor Coordination: A lack of coordination among security agencies has limited their effectiveness in responding to the Lakurawa threat.

• Insufficient Resources: Inadequate funding and logistical support have hampered the ability of security forces to conduct effective operations.

• Weak Community Engagement: Insufficient community engagement and intelligence-sharing with local populations have hindered the gathering of critical information.

How to effectively tackle the Lakurawas

To effectively counter the Lakurawa terror group in North West Nigeria, we do not need to reinvent the wheel, Nigeria’s National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE), and the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act (TPPA) of 2022 provide a robust framework. Below are recommendations leveraging these tools:

1. Leveraging NACTEST’s five pillars

NACTEST outlines a multi-faceted approach to counterterrorism. Applying its pillars to the Lakurawa threat:

a. Forestall (Prevent)

· Community Engagement: Promote early warning mechanisms by empowering community leaders, civil society organisations, and religious figures in North-West Nigeria to identify and report signs of radicalisation or Lakurawa activities.

· Education Initiatives: Counter extremist narratives through school curricula and public campaigns that promote peace and resilience against radical ideologies.

b. Secure

· Border management: Strengthen border surveillance in the North-West to prevent Lakurawa from exploiting porous borders for movement and logistics.