The Lakurawa threat: Time to wake up from our intelligence and security comatose

The Lakurawa terror group has emerged as a significant threat to the stability of North West Nigeria, exploiting weak intelligence frameworks, porous borders, and socio-economic vulnerabilities to wreak havoc on communities in mainly parts of Kebbi and Sokoto State. Despite their growing menace and alleged affiliations with global jihadist networks like the Islamic State, Nigeria’s intelligence and security apparatus has remained largely reactive and fragmented. This “intelligence and security comatose” has emboldened the group, allowing them to expand their operations and destabilise the region further. Now is the time for decisive action to wake up from this inertia, strengthen our counter-terrorism strategies, and implement robust, proactive measures. By leveraging modern intelligence tools, fostering collaboration across government levels, and addressing the socio-economic drivers of extremism, Nigeria can effectively confront the Lakurawa threat and restore peace to affected regions.

Origins of the Lakurawas in Northwest Nigeria

The Lakurawas are a radical terror group in North West Nigeria’s complex security landscape particularly in parts of Sokoto and Kebbi State. The term “Lakurawa” may have originated from the french word “la recrue” meaning the recruit. It is used by locals of communities in parts of Sokoto and Kebbi to describe itinerant groups, who were initially nomadic herders, but subsequently engaged in proselytisation and more recently armed radicalised groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) who enforce their brand of Islam and were predisposed to targeting and attacking mainly security forces and communities who resisted them. These groups, believed to have originated from across the Sahel, particularly Mali, primarily operate in rural and forested areas, exploiting weak state presence and governance vacuums.

In 2018, communities in parts of Gudu and Tanghaza Local Government Areas of Sokoto State reported to the State authorities of the presence of armed herdsmen suspected to be Malians whom they referred to as “Lakurawa” that had converged in Marake Forest in Gudu Local Government Area and Wassaniya, Tunigara, Moliava, Jina-Jincti villages in Tangaza Local Government Area both of Sokoto state.

The then Police Commissioner in Sokoto State, Murtala Mani issued a statement where he discountenanced any concern regarding the presence of the group. According to him, “intelligence gathered from competent authorities of the area” indicated that the herdsmen were annual visitors to the nearby forests bordering the two local government area with their cattle, but that the number of the cattle increased exponentially this year, to about 3000 from the usual figures of about 500 to 700. He explained that the herdsmen usually stay in the forest in Niger Republic whenever they embark on such annual movement but occasionally enter the villages of Gudu and Tanghaza LGAs to procure food and other essentials before returning to the forest in Niger Republic.

“The nexus between Lakurawas and other terror groups in the Sahel are sometimes driven by mutual interests where we increasingly monitor terrorist groups often exploiting local banditry networks for logistics, intelligence, and funds.”

Despite these reports indicating that the groups were rejected by communities in Gada and Tanghaza LGAs, some component of the academia site research work by Professor Murtala Rufai of the Usman Danfodio University Sokoto and security forces, which indicated that the Lakurawas were invited to the locations by the District Head of Balle in Gudu Local Government together with the District Head of Gongono in Tanghaza LGAs with the support of the then Chairman of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) Alhaji Bello Wamakko to help the communities fend off marauding bandits from Zamfara State.

There are reports that indicate that the Lakurawas fought and drove away bandits from some of these communities but other indications are that they also collaborated with them in some instances.

“By leveraging modern intelligence tools, fostering collaboration across government levels, and addressing the socio-economic drivers of extremism, Nigeria can effectively confront the Lakurawa threat and restore peace to affected regions.”

The key factors behind their emergence include:

1. Historical marginalisation: Many members of Lakurawa groups hail from nomadic or semi-nomadic communities, particularly the Fulani. Across the sahel, over decades, conflicts over land use, cattle grazing, and water resources have fueled tensions between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, creating a fertile ground for armed uprisings.

2. Economic drivers: Widespread poverty and limited access to livelihoods have incentivised criminal activities as a means of survival or enrichment.

3. Weak governance and policing: Limited state control in rural areas, compounded by ineffective law enforcement, has allowed these groups to grow with impunity.

4. Regional instability and proliferation of arms: The Sahel region has seen significant arms trafficking due to ongoing conflicts in countries like Libya, Mali, and Niger. The Lakurawa have benefited from this proliferation, enabling them to acquire sophisticated weaponry.

Affiliations with terror groups in the Sahel

The Lakurawas do not function as a monolithic entity but rather as a network of loosely affiliated groups. The nexus between Lakurawas and other terror groups in the Sahel are sometimes driven by mutual interests where we increasingly monitor terrorist groups often exploiting local banditry networks for logistics, intelligence, and funds. In return, they provide arms, ideological support, or safe havens). Additionally the criminal and ideological disposition of the groups present blurred lines. While not all Lakurawas are ideologically driven, the overlap of their activities with those of other terrorist groups makes it challenging to distinguish between purely criminal and extremist motives.

The affiliations of the Lakurawa terror group with other terror organisations in the Sahel are likely influenced by strategic, ideological, and operational considerations. While specific intelligence on Lakurawa’s linkages may not be widely available, the following points explore plausible connections and affiliations based on patterns observed among extremist groups operating in the Sahel region:

1. Ideological affiliations

. Shared Islamist extremism: Lakurawa may share ideological frameworks with prominent Sahelian groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Such shared beliefs in establishing Sharia governance or opposing Western influence often serve as a basis for collaboration or mutual recognition.