Few people can escape the tumultuous Brexit debate. But for those of us who live in Britain, it is our daily grind. You are gripped everyday by the high decibels of the babel of voices, the cacophonous noises, the staccato rhythm. The events over the past two weeks, during which the UK parliament seized control of the government’s legislative agenda and the prime minister was forced to promise to resign if her Brexit deal was passed, show how Britain’s decision in 2016 to leave the European Union is convulsing the country.
But the seeds of the Brexit crisis were sown in three major events that I previously captured in this column. When Britain voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU, after 43 years of membership,I wrote a piece entitled “Seismic shifts as Britain ends fractious relations with Europe” (BusinessDay, 4 July 2016). The problem was not the EU referendum itself – every nation has the right to decide its destiny – but the fact that the information that shaped the people’s decision to vote to leave the EU was flawed. They were told, for instance, that leaving the EU would be simple and straightforward. But disentangling Britain from its 43 year-old-relationship with the EU wasn’t going to be a walk in the park!
The second seed of the crisis was the lack of overwhelming support for Brexit. In the referendum vote, 17,410,742 people (51.89%) voted to leave the EU, while 16, 141,241 (48.11%) voted to remain. Of course, in a democracy, the majority wins. But in a monumental decision to leave the EU, after 43 years, with potential adverse economic consequences, a 52/48 split wasn’t not good enough. Yes, 17m voted to leave, but what about the 16m who voted to stay in? Surely, only flexibility and a Brexit compromise that reflected the positions of both Leavers and Remainers would have been ideal.
But the government hastily nailed its colours to the mast. On 29 March 2017, it submitted a letter, under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union, notifying the EU of its decision to leave the union. I wrote a piece, entitled “The die is cast as Britain starts exit talks with the EU” (BusinessDay, 3 April 2017). Indeed, the die was cast, because once Article 50 was invoked, the UK must leave the EU exactly two years later, whether or not it had agreed exit terms with the EU, unless the remaining 27 member states agreed unanimously to extend the two-year period to allow negotiations to continue.
By invoking the Article 50 notification, just nine months after the referendum vote, without a detailed plan for the negotiations,the government sowed another seed of the Brexit crisis. As the clock ticked and the negotiations deadlocked, pressure piled on the government, which had set 29 March 2019 in legislation as the exit date. Running against that clock and the possibility of not leaving on that date and having to ask the EU for an extension would be deeply embarrassing. But that’s how it turned outto be as the 29 March 2019 presumptive Brexit date became undeliverable.
But why was the original Brexit date impossible? Well, that brings us to yet another seed of the crisis: the lack of parliamentary majority for Brexit. On 18 April 2017, just a month after invoking Article 50, Prime Minister Theresa May called a snap election with the aim of securing a large parliamentary majority to drive through her Brexit agenda. But it backfired spectacularly. Instead of winning an absolute majority, her party lost the 17-seat majority it had before the election and had to rely on the Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), with 10 MPs, to form a government,which gave her a miniscule majority of nine!
After the election, I wrote a piece, entitled “Hard or soft Brexit? Britain’s dilemma after a chaotic election” (BusinessDay 19 June 2017). Surely, once the government lost its parliamentary majority and had to rely on a small party, the DUP, with its own vestedinterests, Brexit would be almost impossible to deliver,especially, given the irreconcilable differences between advocates of a soft Brexitand supporters of a hard Brexit. It is precisely this soft Brexit-hard Brexitschism, and the failure to find a deal that commands the majority in parliament, that have caused the convulsion in British politics and the Brexit deadlock.
In November last year, the prime minister secured a deal with the EU on the terms of Britain’s withdrawal and a framework for negotiating future economic relations. But when the withdrawal deal was put to parliament on 15 January, it was overwhelmingly rejected by 230 votes. After some minor concession by the EU, the government presented the deal to parliament again on 12 March, but it was also rejected, this time by 149 votes. Last week, on 29 March, the original Brexit date, the deal was rejected again, for the third time, by 58 votes, despite the prime minister’s promise to resign if it was passed.
But what are the sticking points? Well, its different strokes for different folks! Apart from playing partisan politics, Labour rejected the deal because it didn’t include commitments to the single market and some form of customs union arrangement. Some Conservatives, who favour a soft Brexit, rejected the deal for the same reasons: absence of single market and/or customs union commitments. But the DUP opposed the deal because it contained the so-called Irish backstop, designed to prevent a customs border being erected between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but which would require Northern Ireland to be treated differently from the rest of the UK by being tied closer to the EU customs union and single market. Some Conservatives who want a hard Brexit didn’t like the deal at all because it would still tie Britain to the EU. And, then, there are those who don’t want Britain to leave the EU and want a second referendum!So, Britain is deadlocked on Brexit.
Interestingly, two-thirds of parliament don’t want Britain to leave the EU without a deal, but they can’t agree on any particular deal. Last week, MPs voted on eight different options, in the so-called indicative votes, but all of them were rejected. Of course, business hates the uncertainty, while preferring a soft Brexit deal. The EU, too, wants a deal. Although, only 15% of EU exports go to Britain, while about 50% of UK exports go to the EU, both would suffer hugely from a no-deal exit, but Britain would suffer more. According to a recent study, the UK alone would suffer income losses of Euro 57bn if it left the EU without a deal, while the rest lose Euro 22bn.
But with the withdrawal deal now rejected for the third time, there is no immediate prospect of a deal. In a recent decision, the EU leaders that said that if the UK did not approve the withdrawal deal, it must leave the EU on 12 April or come up with another plan, which must include asking for a long extension, during which there could be an election or a second referendum, which could resolve the stalemate. A tough choice for Britain!
The Brexit lesson, even for Nigeria, is that no country can make progress with entrenched divergent positions and lack of consensus, and the national interest can’t be determined by the leader, but consensually through negotiations!
Olu Fasan
