“Local ownership” or Strategic abdication? Rethinking Nigeria’s counterinsurgency doctrine

Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede, has argued that the defeat of insurgency in the Northeast depends fundamentally on local ownership. His assertion that the people of Borno and Yobe must take responsibility because many perpetrators originate from those states touches a sensitive but critical debate in counterinsurgency strategy. While the logic of community participation in security is well established, the framing of responsibility raises deeper questions about state capacity, accountability, and the political economy of violence in Nigeria’s most conflict-affected region.

The strategic logic of local ownership

At a doctrinal level, Oluyede’s position aligns with contemporary counterinsurgency thinking. Modern warfare against non-state actors emphasises that military force alone cannot defeat insurgency. Instead, legitimacy, intelligence, and civilian cooperation are decisive. In this regard, local ownership is not merely desirable but essential.

Communities possess granular knowledge of terrain, social networks, and suspicious movements that formal security forces often lack. In Borno and Yobe, where insurgents frequently blend into civilian populations, actionable intelligence from locals can determine whether operations succeed or fail. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) exemplifies this dynamic, having played a pivotal role in identifying Boko Haram members and supporting military campaigns.

However, the concept of local ownership extends beyond intelligence-sharing. It implies that communities actively reject insurgent ideology, deny recruits, and participate in rebuilding governance structures. In theory, when communities become stakeholders in their own security, insurgent groups lose both sanctuary and legitimacy. Oluyede’s statement, therefore, reflects a strategic truth: insurgency thrives where the population is either complicit, coerced, or alienated.

The problematic framing of responsibility

Despite its strategic validity, the Chief of Defence Staff’s framing introduces a contentious narrative by suggesting that the burden of responsibility lies primarily with local populations. This risks conflating victimhood with complicity. The people of Borno and Yobe have been the primary victims of Boko Haram’s violence, enduring mass displacement, economic collapse, and psychological trauma.

To argue that “the bulk of perpetrators” come from these states is factually plausible but analytically insufficient. Insurgencies are inherently localised phenomena; recruits typically emerge from the same socio-economic environment in which the conflict occurs. This does not imply collective responsibility. Rather, it underscores the failure of state structures to address conditions that enable recruitment.

The danger in Oluyede’s framing is that it may shift attention away from systemic shortcomings. Weak governance, chronic poverty, corruption, and decades of underinvestment in the Northeast created fertile ground for extremist movements. By emphasising local ownership without equal emphasis on state accountability, the narrative risks becoming a subtle form of strategic deflection.

Structural drivers of insurgency

Any serious analysis of insurgency in Northeast Nigeria must confront its structural roots. Boko Haram did not emerge in a vacuum. Its rise was facilitated by a combination of economic marginalisation, political neglect, and institutional fragility.

Borno State, historically one of Nigeria’s poorest regions, suffers from limited access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Youth unemployment remains high, creating a pool of individuals vulnerable to radicalisation or coercion. In such contexts, insurgent groups often provide alternative systems of authority, offering financial incentives, protection, or a sense of belonging.

Moreover, governance deficits have eroded trust between citizens and the state. Reports of human rights abuses by security forces, including arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial actions, have further alienated local populations. When communities perceive the state as predatory or ineffective, cooperation becomes difficult, regardless of official calls for “ownership”.

Thus, while local participation is critical, it cannot substitute for structural reform. Without addressing the underlying socio-economic and political conditions, calls for community responsibility risk becoming hollow rhetoric.

The limits of community-based security

The Nigerian experience with community-based security initiatives reveals both their potential and their limitations. Groups like the CJTF have demonstrated effectiveness in intelligence gathering and local defence. Yet their rise also reflects gaps in formal security provision.

Reliance on such groups introduces several risks. First, issues of accountability arise, as these militias often operate with limited oversight. Allegations of abuse, extortion, and internal rivalries have surfaced over time. Second, the proliferation of armed civilian groups can complicate post-conflict stabilisation, particularly if they are not properly integrated or demobilised.

Furthermore, placing excessive responsibility on communities may lead to fatigue and resentment. Populations already burdened by conflict may lack the capacity to sustain long-term security efforts. Expecting them to shoulder the primary burden of counterinsurgency overlooks the fundamental role of the state as the guarantor of security.

Intelligence, trust, and the social contract
At the heart of the local ownership debate lies the issue of trust. Effective counterinsurgency depends on a functioning social contract between the state and its citizens. Communities must believe that providing information will lead to improved security rather than retaliation or neglect.

In Northeast Nigeria, this trust deficit remains a significant obstacle. Fear of reprisals from insurgents discourages civilians from cooperating with security forces. At the same time, concerns about the conduct of those forces create hesitation. Bridging this gap requires more than rhetoric; it demands consistent, credible actions that demonstrate the state’s commitment to protecting its citizens.

This includes improving the professionalism of security forces, ensuring accountability for misconduct, and delivering tangible development outcomes. Only when communities see clear benefits from cooperation will the concept of local ownership translate into sustained engagement.

Political economy of conflict

Another dimension often overlooked in discussions of local ownership is the political economy of insurgency. Conflict in Northeast Nigeria has generated complex networks of interests, including illicit trade, aid dependency, and security-related expenditures.

Some actors, both local and external, derive economic or political benefits from the continuation of instability. This complicates efforts to mobilise communities against insurgents. If elements within the system profit from conflict, calls for collective responsibility may ring hollow.

Addressing this requires a broader strategy that tackles corruption, improves transparency in security spending, and ensures that reconstruction efforts genuinely benefit affected populations. Without confronting these dynamics, local ownership risks being undermined by structural incentives that perpetuate violence.

Reframing local ownership

For local ownership to be effective, it must be repositioned as a system of shared responsibility rather than a transfer of burden onto affected communities. The insurgency in Northeast Nigeria is rooted in long-standing governance failures, meaning communities alone cannot resolve it. Instead, local ownership should function as a partnership in which the state provides security, justice, and development, while citizens contribute intelligence, social cohesion, and resistance to extremist influence. This relationship must be anchored in trust and accountability, not implicit blame. Strengthening local institutions, empowering community-led peacebuilding, and integrating traditional and religious leaders into formal security frameworks are critical steps toward achieving this balance.

Conclusion: Between necessity and responsibility

Local participation is indispensable to defeating insurgency, but it is not sufficient on its own. Without addressing structural inequalities, governance deficits, and institutional weaknesses, calls for local ownership risk oversimplifying the conflict. A sustainable solution depends on a genuinely collaborative approach in which the state retains primary responsibility for security while enabling communities to play a meaningful, supported role.