Inside Boko Haram’s bloody reunion

…JAS, ISWAP alliance reignites assault on military formations

…Return of suicide bombings signals escalation

…Citizens question essence of US troops’ presence

The road into Maiduguri has long carried the weight of a war that refuses to end. But in recent weeks, the signs have become harder to ignore: more checkpoints, tighter patrols, and an uneasy quiet that residents say often precedes violence. Then, last Monday, the silence shattered.

Three coordinated suicide attacks struck different locations across the Borno State capital, killing more than 25 people and leaving dozens wounded. The blasts were not just another tragic episode in Nigeria’s protracted insurgency; they were a signal. They marked a troubling shift: a resurgence of tactics once thought to be in decline, and, more critically, the consequences of a renewed alliance between rival terrorist factions.

A dangerous convergence

Following months of quiet negotiations, security findings indicate that the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has reached what insiders describe as an “unholy agreement” with factions of JAS, particularly groups led by Bakura Doro and Modu Mainok.

The development represents a significant turning point in a conflict long defined by internal rivalries. For years, clashes between JAS and ISWAP weakened insurgent cohesion, costing both sides hundreds of fighters and limiting their operational reach. That dynamic is now shifting.

“Our findings revealed that the alliances between the two terrorist groups have posed a serious threat to the security architecture of this country, considering the coordinated attacks witnessed in the last month in the northeast region,” a security source said.

The alliance, analysts say, builds on broader efforts by IS-linked elements across the Sahel to consolidate influence. Foreign fighters from Niger Republic, Burkina Faso, Togo and Libya are believed to be strengthening coordination, logistics and operational planning. On the ground, the effects are already visible.

JAS fighters operating in Bama are now reportedly coordinating with ISWAP elements in Sambisa Forest and the Mandara Hills. One such joint operation was seen in the attack around Banki junction, where a Nigerian major and dozens of soldiers were killed.

“They are working jointly, which would strengthen their collective capacity to target military forces, civilian security volunteers, Christians, and the local community. The alliance between JAS and ISWAP would significantly pose a threat in the northeast, particularly Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states,” the source added.

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A wave of coordinated assaults

Military installations have become primary targets, with insurgents demonstrating improved planning, timing and firepower. Within a single week, multiple bases came under attack across locations including Ngoshe, Kukawa, Dalori, Konduga, Dalwa, Marte, Jakana, Mainok, Damasak, Abadam and Mallam Fotori. The cost has been severe.

At least three commanding officers were killed in separate assaults across Borno: Major U.I. Mairiga in Mayenti, Lt-Col Umar Faruq in Kukawa, and Lt-Col S.I. Iliyasu in Konduga. Their deaths bring to seven the number of commanding officers, and one brigadier general, lost in just three months.

Security experts say the targeted killing of senior officers is a deliberate strategy.

Such losses, they note, disrupt command structures, weaken operational coordination and provide propaganda victories for insurgents. Forward operating bases, which form the backbone of counterinsurgency efforts, are particularly vulnerable when leadership is compromised.

In Kukawa and Konduga, reports indicate fierce fighting as insurgents overran or attempted to overrun military formations. In Ngoshe, the situation was even more dire.

On March 5, 2026, suspected Boko Haram/ISWAP fighters invaded parts of the community, killing dozens, including soldiers, a local Imam, community elders and civilians, while more than 300 people, mostly women and children, were abducted or declared missing. The town was reportedly held for days before a joint operation by troops and civilian forces regained control.

A resident described fleeing shortly after the attack, underscoring the scale of devastation.

Return of a feared tactic

Equally concerning is the return of suicide bombings. Over a decade ago, Nigeria witnessed the peak of such attacks, with dozens recorded annually. Over time, improved intelligence and sustained military pressure reduced their frequency to just a handful each year, one of the few measurable gains in the conflict. Now, that progress appears fragile.

The Maiduguri attacks, along with a similar mosque bombing in December, suggest a deliberate reintroduction of suicide missions into the insurgents’ tactical playbook. Analysts interpret this as both a psychological weapon and a sign of renewed organisational capacity.

Suicide bombings require recruitment, indoctrination, logistics and coordination, an indication that insurgents are rebuilding structures that had previously been degraded.

Data from conflict monitors reinforce the trend. In 2025 alone, Borno recorded over 400 military confrontations and more than 100 bombings, the highest levels in years, according to ACLED. What once appeared to be a contained insurgency is again expanding in intensity.

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Night warfare and shifting tactics

Beyond suicide attacks, insurgents are also adapting technologically and tactically.

According to security sources, one of the most significant shifts is the increasing use of night-time warfare.

The groups are exploiting the Nigerian military’s reliance on aerial support, which is often limited during night operations. By launching simultaneous attacks after dark, insurgents are able to stretch response capacity and overwhelm isolated units.

“The terrorists are fully aware that Nigerian troops rely heavily on aerial support during combat operations, which is often unavailable during nighttime engagements,” the source explained.

“The military should increase night vision equipment and capacity. Most of our modern air capability… could do better. Military technology is the way to go, and there is also an urgent need to activate another military base in the northern part of Borno to enhance operational effectiveness along the fringes of the Lake Chad Basin.”

This tactical evolution, combining night assaults, coordinated strikes and leadership targeting—l, has significantly increased the pressure on security forces.

While Borno remains the epicentre, the violence is no longer confined to the North-East.

Recent attacks in Kwara State, linked to ISIS-affiliated fighters, have extended the conflict into the North-Central region. Communities in Kaima Local Government Area, including Woro and Nuku, have experienced massacres and abductions, echoing patterns once limited to Borno and its environs.

The geographic spread highlights a broader transformation: insurgency in Nigeria is becoming more fluid, more mobile and more interconnected with wider Sahelian instability.

The US factor and growing skepticism

Amid the deteriorating security landscape, the presence of foreign troops has come under scrutiny.

Last month, the United States deployed about 100 personnel to Nigeria to train local forces in counter-terrorism operations. The deployment, based in Bauchi State, is part of a renewed security partnership between both countries.

That partnership gained urgency following Nigeria’s redesignation as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) by the US government in late 2025, a move that internationalised Nigeria’s security crisis and added a layer of diplomatic tension.

Nigerian authorities rejected the designation, arguing that the violence is rooted not in religious persecution but in a complex mix of criminality, resource competition, and regional instability spilling over from the Sahel.

Behind the scenes, diplomatic engagements intensified. Nigeria signalled willingness to cooperate militarily while pushing back against what it described as a mischaracterisation of its internal conflict.

The collaboration has already produced unprecedented outcomes, including the Christmas Day US airstrikes targeting insurgent enclaves in Sokoto State, marking the first confirmed direct American military action on Nigerian soil.

Yet, for many Nigerians, the question remains: has any of this made them safer?

Public sentiment, especially in affected regions, reflects growing scepticism. Despite increased cooperation and foreign presence, attacks have intensified, not diminished. For communities living under the constant threat of violence, strategic partnerships mean little without tangible improvements in security.

Calls for urgent action

Civil society groups warn that the renewed alliance between JAS and ISWAP could reverse gains made in the war against insurgency if not urgently addressed.

“The recent alliance between the ISWAP and Boko Haram is really a source of concern to the peace and security process in the region,” said Ahmed Shehu, chairman of Civil Society Organisations in the Northeast. “Now, then, imagine if these two terrorist groups have come together… it’s really going to be devastating to us.”

He urged security stakeholders to reassess strategies, noting that troops are often outnumbered during attacks.

“When you have 400 to 500 people attacking less than 200 to 300 people… you can imagine the kind of havoc that will happen,” he said.

Shehu called for increased recruitment, improved equipment and better welfare for soldiers.

“What is required here is to fortify the troop, increase their number, and also give them the necessary equipment… terrorists came up with a strategy of attacking multiple places at the same time… to divide the attention of the Nigerian troops.”

He also stressed the need for stronger airpower capacity and better resource utilisation.

“I want to say emphatically that our soldiers should be motivated so that they know that they are fighting for their country… and their families will be taken care of.”

A war entering a new phase

What is unfolding in Nigeria’s fight against terrorism is not just a resurgence of violence, it is a transformation.

The convergence of Boko Haram factions, the return of suicide bombings, the adoption of night warfare and the widening geographic spread of attacks all point to an insurgency that is evolving faster than the response designed to contain it.

Back in Maiduguri, the echoes of Monday’s explosions linger. For residents, survival has always depended on adaptation. Now, the same may be required of the state.