In my inaugural piece, and its sequel, on the ongoing spat between the United States and Nigerian governments, I highlighted the risk an escalation of the disagreement portends for both countries and the pathways to de-escalation and de-risking. In this article, I will expand on the de-escalation pathway: reframing the spat as a partnership for mutual benefit. Desmond Tutu, in his book, No Future Without Forgiveness, and speeches during the Zimbabwe crisis mediation (2007–2008), advised that “If you want peace, you don’t talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies. Negotiate—don’t escalate. A crisis between nations is not resolved by threats or sanctions alone, but by sitting at the table, acknowledging mutual fears, and finding the shared humanity that makes security possible for both.” These wise words should prevail on the US and Nigerian governments to reconvene and, where necessary, create new diplomatic avenues for actualising shared objectives and avert a further alienation that only benefits geopolitical rivals.
A two-pronged strategy is now manifest in the manner the US government is handling Nigeria over the “Christian genocide” allegation. This strategy combines military threat, which appears to be receding, and legislative action with the introduction of H.R. 860 by Congressman Chris Smith and Congressman Bill Huizenga, the most likely and tenable approach. Each prong in this strategy portends significant risks for Nigeria, a country that is already precariously tethered to the rungs of fragility.
A military attack to liberate Christians from their murderous Islamist attackers, as President Trump stated, leaves the huge Muslim communities in Nigeria, who are also victims of these attacks, ostracised, further polarising the country. This presents a veritable risk of social fragmentation in Nigeria. Similarly, the threat of sanctions and the ensuing erosion of investor confidence, fuelled by the perception that Nigeria is unsafe for investment, risk reversing hard-won gains such as recent macroeconomic stability, including a relatively stable exchange rate and growing foreign reserves, and potentially widening poverty and hurting economic growth. This will be most unfortunate given the sacrifices that Nigerians have had to make over the last two years, plus since the reforms were introduced.
Added to this is the potential for expanding a geopolitical “proxy” conflict that pitches the US against China and Russia. Already, there are enough indicators to show that this may be the predominant reason that precipitated this spat. Further indicators are that the US strategic objectives in Nigeria and the West Africa subregion are the core reason for its stance and that it would continue to apply pressure using a hybrid of the two-pronged strategy until its interests are achieved.
“Let the politicians take a back seat and allow the experts in intelligence, diplomacy, statecraft and security and defence strategy to do their work, after which the politicians can leverage the 8 levers of influence in the US to actualise shared objectives and avert an escalation of the diplomatic spat between Nigeria and the US.”
At the moment, the most immediate victory for the Nigerian government was the swift erection of a diplomatic shield that effectively isolated and neutralised the U.S. threat of military action—the promise of intervention “guns-a-blazing”. Nigeria successfully leveraged global multipolarity to secure its sovereignty, positioning the dispute as a fight for African self-determination against perceived Western overreach. This diplomatic momentum peaked around November 8, as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union collectively reinforced their support for Nigeria, urging partners to utilise dialogue and capacity-building rather than coercion. ECOWAS issued an unambiguous rejection of the specific U.S. allegation of “Christian genocide”, warning that such claims were false and dangerous, seeking to “deepen insecurity” and “weaken social cohesion”. This was followed by the African Union Commission (AUC), reaffirming Nigeria’s sovereign right to manage its internal affairs and explicitly rejecting any narrative that “weaponises religion” or resorts to unilateral threats of military intervention. This coordinated diplomatic defence may have achieved its core strategic objective: it made U.S. military action politically untenable and legally unjustifiable under international law, forcing Washington to pivot away from kinetic threats.
Furthermore, two of Nigeria’s strategic allies, and possibly the irritants and causes of the spat, stepped forward. China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, publicly stated that Beijing firmly supports Nigeria as a comprehensive strategic partner and opposes any country using religion or human rights as a pretext to interfere in internal affairs, explicitly rejecting “threats of sanctions or military coercion”. Russia also responded on November 7, 2025, with Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stating during a Moscow press briefing that the Kremlin is closely monitoring the situation and developments related to potential US military action in Nigeria. She urged Washington to respect international law, act responsibly, and adhere to global legal norms, warning against unilateral interventions that could undermine Nigeria’s sovereignty and escalate regional tensions. Zakharova’s remarks reflect Moscow’s broader strategy to counter Western influence in Africa, where Russia has deepened ties with Nigeria through military cooperation, including arms supplies and anti-terrorism training.
To neutralise the US legislative push for sanctions and reverse the economic uncertainty, the Nigerian government should sustain and advance current efforts at direct engagement, including a president-to-president meeting and with the eight levers of influence within the US government apparatus, while adopting an integrated, three-track strategy focused on accountability, diplomatic clarity, and economic autonomy. Nigeria must embrace this principle of “shared responsibility” to turn the crisis into a catalyst for institutional strength.
1. Be serious about addressing the national security challenge: The current approach, which is considered superficial and rudimentary and lacking in structural and institutional depth, is hence unable to meet the requirements of our national security imperatives, including those listed in the Renewed Hope Agenda or mandate. Therefore, the Tinubu administration should, as a matter of urgency, convene the national security and defence councils and activate the accountability pivot aimed at dismantling the impunity trap, which is what riled the US government and will continue to do so until they see a change. These two highest platforms for national security management should discuss a strategic pathway to achieve the dual requirement for accountability and for ending the impunity in national security, as well as other extant threats generated by the spat. This is the only way to neutralise both the US threat of military strike and the legislative push for the impending and inevitable sanctions, which target complicit individuals, that can be averted. In other words, Nigeria must show a measurable road map for addressing its security challenge. This will be a demonstrable action plan that is both effective and efficient in addressing the myriad of security challenges affecting the country. No doubt a herculean task, given that these challenges have been left to fester. But there is no room for excuses. Else, Nigeria faces the dual possibility of US military and economic might against it. The government must visibly and rapidly prosecute not only non-state actors but also any security personnel implicated in the ongoing security challenge. This must be transparent and verifiable, leveraging the pressure of the CPC to achieve the very justice the citizens are demanding.
The National Assembly, the Senate and the House of Representatives must play their part by strengthening legislative instruments both to support and, where necessary, realign the executive to ensure set objectives in national security are met.
The judiciary also has a role to play in ensuring access to justice and speedy prosecution. There can be no peace without justice.
The above levels of approach to security should be replicated at the subnational level, where the elected officials and business, traditional and religious leaders should play their role in supporting public security. This should include the governors establishing platforms that support identification, deterring or delaying threats and responding to, reviewing and recovering from public security occurrences.
2. Aim at diplomatic clarity: This requires strategic narrative control aimed at a partnership to reframe coercion. Nigeria must shift entirely away from rhetorical defense and toward private, resolute collaboration. It must welcome U.S. security assistance, but firmly insist that it respects Nigerian sovereignty. This strategy must leverage a resolve for security sector reform and enhanced security sector governance to convince partners that their intelligence-sharing and aid will be effective. The goal is to reframe the relationship: the U.S. should view Nigeria not as a failing client state requiring threats, but as a strategic partner requiring enhanced support to protect regional stability.
3. Aim for economic autonomy through diplomatic de-weaponisation and economic resilience: To neutralise the risk of financial coercion, Nigeria must strategically reduce its reliance on the aid Washington has threatened to cut. This involves aggressively promoting economic and military diversification. By strategically integrating global partners—including the U.S.—into Nigeria’s vital energy and infrastructure sectors, Abuja creates an economic synergy that makes the imposition of sanctions counterproductive to U.S. interests.
4. Avert the Lobbyist Scourge: This moment of extreme national distress is being viewed by global consultants and lobbyists as a massive commercial opportunity. Nigeria must avoid committing vast public funds to external lobbying firms that promise a quick, external fix. These groups specialise in reputation laundering but offer no solutions for the fundamental deficit in governance and accountability that led to the CPC designation. Every kobo spent on external fixers is a kobo diverted from the much-needed security sector reform and reinforcing the Nigeria Police Force or ensuring swift justice, which are the only genuine mechanisms that will restore investor confidence and remove the CPC designation. The solution is not purchased influence abroad; it has earned credibility at home through decisive, structural reform.
There are very hard issues that need to be addressed. But there is no hiding place, and to address them we must. Politics has its place, but more of this should be handled by specialists. Let the politicians take a back seat and allow the experts in intelligence, diplomacy, statecraft and security and defence strategy to do their work, after which the politicians can leverage the 8 levers of influence in the US to actualise shared objectives and avert an escalation of the diplomatic spat between Nigeria and the US.
Kabir Adamu is the Managing Director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited.
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